People v. Crosby

Opinion

MERRILL, Acting P. J.

In this case we decide that in accepting a guilty plea to a felony the trial court is not required to advise the defendant that his conviction may result in an enhanced sentence for a future felony conviction.

Procedural Background

Appellant Courtney J. Crosby was charged by information with robbery (Pen. Code,

1

§ 211). The information also alleged that Crosby had suffered two prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of section 667, rape (§ 261) and unlawful oral copulation (§ 288, subd. (a)). The prior convictions were the result of Crosby’s guilty pleas to these offenses in an earlier proceeding.

Crosby pied not guilty to the robbery charge in the instant case and denied the allegations of prior felony convictions. He subsequently withdrew his plea, pied guilty to robbery, and admitted the prior felony convictions but reserved the right to challenge their constitutionality.

Thereafter Crosby moved to strike the prior felony convictions, which motion was denied. Crosby was sentenced to the lower term of two years for the robbery and an additional five years for one of the prior felony convictions. The court struck the remaining prior felony conviction on the ground that it was not a separate prior conviction for sentencing purposes.

Discussion

Crosby contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike both prior felony convictions. He urges the convictions were unconstitutional as at the time he pied guilty, he was not advised they could be used in the future to enhance his sentence in the event of a subsequent conviction. We find no merit in his position.

In guilty plea cases the defendant must be advised of all direct consequences of conviction.

(Bunnell

v.

Superior Court

(1975) 13 Cal.3d

[1355]