GWARTZ v. Superior Court

Opinion

SILLS, P. J.

Sometime ago, a handful of judges on the local superior court bench began deciding summary judgment motions without, according the parties, the benefit of oral argument. The decision to rule from behind closed doors apparently was based on some loose dicta in

Sweat

v.

Hollister

(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 603 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 399] (disapproved on another point in

Santisas

v.

Goodin

(1998) 17 Cal.4th 599, 609, fn. 5 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 830, 951 P.2d 399]) to the effect that law and motion courts may decide motions without hearing oral argument.

In

Mediterranean Construction Co.

v.

State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.

(1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 257 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 781], this court took a long, hard look at the language of Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, and came to the inescapable conclusion that, as now drafted, it requires oral argument on summary judgment motions. This court held that while trial judges “retain extensive discretion regarding how the hearing is to be conducted, including imposing time limits and adopting tentative ruling procedures,” they may not refuse to hear oral argument. (66 Cal.App.4th at p. 265.)

We thought — incorrectly, as it turned out — that the trial courts would simply follow our opinion even if they disagreed with it. Stare decisis and all thát stuff. (See

Auto Equity Sales, Inc.

v.

Superior Court

(1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal.Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937] [“Decisions of every division of the District Courts of Appeal are binding upon ... all the superior courts of this state”]; cf. Cal. Code Jud. Conduct, canon 3B.) But sometimes it seems

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