Pinson v. Cole
Before: Armstrong
Opinion
ARMSTRONG, J.
Plaintiff John T. Pinson appeals the judgment entered after the trial court sustained defendant James L. Cole’s demurrer to plaintiffs first amended complaint. That complaint sought to enforce a marital dissolution judgment pursuant to which Mr. Cole was ordered to repay a debt which his ex-wife owed to Mr. Pinson. We conclude that Mr. Pinson was precluded from enforcing the subject judgment, and so affirm the trial court.
Facts
In June of 1994, Mr. Pinson loaned Mr. Cole’s then wife, Audrey Cole, $57,500. Pursuant to the terms of a promissory note executed by Mrs. Cole, the loan, which bore no interest, was to be repaid on June 15, 1997. The note further provided that “no action shall be entertained by said court or any court of competent jurisdiction if filed more than one year subsequent to the date the cause(s) of action actually accrued regardless of whether damages were otherwise as of said time calculable.”
Mr. and Mrs. Cole were married on August 8, 1981, separated on February 22, 1991, and divorced on April 15, 1996. The default judgment for
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dissolution of marriage entered on that date provided, among other things, that Mr. Cole was to pay to Mr. Pinson when due the personal loan represented by the promissory note, which then had an approximate total balance of $50,000, and to hold harmless Mrs. Cole.
Neither Mr. Cole nor Mrs. Cole paid the promissory note when it matured on June 15, 1997. Mr. Pinson filed this lawsuit on March 20, 2001, stating separate causes of action against Mr. and Mrs. Cole for breach of the promissory note. Mr. Pinson specifically pled his right to recover $50,000 from Mr. Cole based on the judgment of dissolution.
Mr. and Mrs. Cole demurred to the complaint. That demurrer was sustained on the ground that the promissory note provided a one-year period to commence suit for nonpayment, which one-year period expired on June 15, 1998. The complaint, filed in March of 2001, was therefore untimely.
The trial court granted Mr. Pinson leave to amend to allege facts regarding the reasonableness of the suit limitation language of the promissory note. Thereafter, the trial court sustained a demurrer to the first amended complaint, which was essentially identical to the original, without leave to amend, and entered judgment for the Coles. Mr. Pinson appeals the judgment solely as to Mr. Cole.
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