People v. Mendoza

California Court of Appeal Mar 6, 2003 No. B158663Published

Before: Mosk

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Holding. The court held that a defendant who pleaded guilty to a nonviolent drug offense before the effective date of Proposition 36 is not entitled to its sentencing provisions, as the term "convicted" in the act refers to the adjudication of guilt rather than the pronouncement of judgment.

Issues

Whether a defendant who pleaded guilty before the effective date of Proposition 36 but was sentenced after is entitled to the act's sentencing provisions.
What is the definition of "convicted" as used in Penal Code section 1210.1, subdivision (a)?

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“We hold that defendant is not entitled to disposition under Proposition 36, because he was "convicted," as that term is used in the act, before its effective date.”

“The conviction thus precedes, rather than includes, the sentence.”

“Our conclusion that "convicted," as used in section 1210.1, subdivision (a), means only adjudication of guilt, and not adjudication of guilt and the judgment, reflects the plain meaning of Proposition 36.”

131 Cal.Rptr.2d 375 (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1030 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

Rafael MENDOZA, Defendant and Appellant.

No. B158663. Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Five.

March 6, 2003. Review Denied May 14, 2003[*] Jonathan B. Steiner and Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant [376] Attorney General, Marc J. Nolan, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Lance E. Winters, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

MOSK, J.

Defendant and appellant Rafael Mendoza pleaded guilty to a nonviolent drug possession offense in 1997, but he failed to appear for his sentencing hearing. Thereafter, the voters passed Proposition 36, the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000, which measure became effective on July 1, 2001. The act provides for probation sentences for certain nonviolent drug offenders and operates prospectively. Defendant was finally arrested in May 2002, and received a sentence that included time to be served in the county jail. We hold that defendant is not entitled to disposition under Proposition 36, because he was "convicted," as that term is used in the act, before its effective date. Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In October 1997, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance, in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a). The terms of his plea agreement were that he would be placed on three years' probation and serve one year in county jail. Defendant failed to appear at a probation and sentencing hearing that was scheduled for November 1997. The trial court issued a bench warrant for his arrest.

Defendant was arrested pursuant to the bench warrant in April 2002. The trial court denied defendant's request for disposition under Proposition 36 and to withdraw his plea. The court sentenced defendant to three years of formal probation on the conditions that he serve 365 days in county jail, pay a $200 restitution fine (Pen.Code,[1] § 1202.4, subd. (b)), and pay a $50 lab analysis fee (Health & Saf.Code, § 11372.5) plus penalty assessments in the amount of $85 (§ 1464; Gov.Code, § 76000).

People v. Mendoza

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MOSK, J.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

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DISCUSSION

DISPOSITION

NOTES

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