County of Los Angeles v. Granite State Insurance

Opinion

ORTEGA, J.

The trial court forfeited bail and entered summary judgment on the forfeiture. The court denied the surety’s (Granite State Insurance Company) motion to set aside the summary judgment and exonerate the bond. We conclude notice of the forfeiture was defective, entitling Granite State to exoneration of the bond.

Criminal defendant Danny Bellrio was released on a $30,000 bond posted by Granite State through its agent Millennium Bail Bonds. Bellrio was ordered to appear for a pretrial hearing on February 13, 2001. When he failed to appear, the trial court forfeited the bail and issued a bench warrant with $10,000 bail. The following constitutes the totality of the February 13 hearing: “The Court: On Bellrio, we are going to issue a bench warrant for Mr. Bellrio. The underlying offense is 11352. I will put $25,000—what was the previous bail? [f] Ms. Villanueva: Bail was previously 30,000. He has no other record. With the probation recommendation, I don’t know whether the Court would consider low bail, [f] The Court: I will at this time. $10,000. [f] The Clerk: Bail forfeited? [][] The Court: Bail forfeited, and 10,000 on the warrant.”

Notwithstanding the above, the clerk prepared a minute order declaring that the court had found “good cause not to forfeit bail” and had ordered the warrant held to March 6, 2001.

[3]

On March 6, Bellrio again failed to appear. The trial court noted that it had “held a bench warrant till today.” It again issued a bench warrant (this time $25,000 bail) and “forfeited” bail.

On March 9, 2001, the trial court issued a notice of bail forfeiture, specifically noting the forfeiture date as March 6, 2001, and making no mention of the February 13 hearing.

Penal Code section 1305, subdivision (b), provides, in part, that “[t]he surety or depositor shall be released of all obligations under the bond if any of the following conditions apply: [f] (1) The clerk fails to mail the notice of forfeiture in accordance with this section within 30 days after the entry of the forfeiture.”

The question becomes whether the trial court forfeited bail on February 13 and, if so, whether the March 9 notice (sent within 30 days of February 13) fulfilled the statutory requirement. We conclude the court unequivocally forfeited bail on February 13 (in spite of the contradictory minute order). We also conclude that the March 9 notice, which specifically limited itself to the March 6 “forfeiture,” failed to adequately advise the surety of the February 13 forfeiture.