Lim v. Silverton

61 Cal.App.4th 1 (1997) PHONG LIM, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

DAVID SILVERTON, Defendant and Respondent.

Docket No. BV21450. Court of Appeals of California, Appellate Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles.

August 21, 1997. [2] COUNSEL

Gary Hollingsworth for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Pius Joseph for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

TODD, J.

In this case the trial court imposed sanctions of $250 against appellant for failing to timely file a questionnaire in advance of the trial setting conference. Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of the order imposing sanctions, which was heard and denied as untimely. Appellant then filed a notice of appeal purporting to appeal from the order imposing sanctions and from the order denying her motion for reconsideration. The record does not reflect that a judgment was entered.

(1) Appellant argues the order imposing sanctions is directly appealable as "`a final order on a collateral matter directing the payment of money,'" relying on I.J. Weinrot & Son, Inc. v. Jackson (1985) 40 Cal.3d 327, 331 [220 Cal. Rptr. 103, 708 P.2d 682] and O'Brien v. Cseh (1983) 148 [3] Cal. App.3d 957, 960 [196 Cal. Rptr. 409]. However, Code of Civil Procedure[1] section 904.1 was amended effective 1990 to change the rule that all monetary sanction orders are appealable. In 1989, the Legislature added subdivision (k), which established a $750 appealability threshold. (See Calhoun v. Vallejo City Unified School Dist. (1993) 20 Cal. App.4th 39, 43-44 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 337].) As amended, subdivision (k) then provided for an appeal "[f]rom a superior court judgment directing payment of monetary sanctions by a party or an attorney for a party only if the amount exceeds seven hundred fifty dollars ($750)." It further provided that lesser sanction judgments against a party or an attorney for a party could be reviewed either on an appeal by that party after entry of final judgment in the main action, or, at the discretion of the Court of Appeal, upon petition for an extraordinary writ. The Calhoun court noted: "`The legislative history of the subdivision indicates the Legislature's intent was to "[e]liminate the right to appeal a judgment or order for the payment of monetary sanctions in cases where the order for payment is $750 or less. Review in such cases... will instead be upon the granting of a petition for an extraordinary writ." ...' [Citation.] Thus, the purpose of subdivision (k) was to restrict the number of appeals from sanction orders. [Citations.]" (Calhoun, supra, 20 Cal. App.4th at p. 44.)