County of Los Angeles v. Navarro

Opinion

RUBIN, J.

Manuel Navarro appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to vacate a default judgment entered against him in 1996. The judgment established his parental relationship with two boys whom respondent County of Los Angeles now concedes are not his sons, and ordered him to pay child support. He seeks reimbursement of child support, welfare reimbursements, attorneys fees, and costs. We reverse.

[248]

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In March 1996, the Bureau of Family Support Operations in the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office

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(the County) filed a complaint to establish the paternity and child support obligations of “Manuel Nava” for two boys bom in December 1995 who had been receiving public assistance. The County attempted substitute service of the complaint in May 1996 by leaving a copy at appellant’s address with “Jane Doe,” listed as “sister” and “co-tenant” and serving a copy by first class mail. The complaint alerted appellant of the danger of not answering the complaint if he denied paternity, and warned he could become liable for child support if the court determined he was the boys’ father. Appellant did not answer the complaint and the County took his default in July 1996. The court thereafter entered judgment establishing appellant’s paternity and ordered him to pay $247 in monthly child support.

Five years later in July 2001 appellant filed a motion to set aside the judgment and have his answer deemed filed because a recent genetic blood test indisputably proved he was not the boys’ father. He claimed that although he lived at the address cited on the complaint’s proof of service, and he never attempted to avoid service, he nonetheless never received a copy of the summons and complaint or default judgment. In support of his motion, he noted that blood tests in a separate paternity action in San Bernardino County had conclusively proven a few months earlier that he was not the boys’ father. Based on those tests, San Bernardino County authorities had dismissed their paternity suit against him with prejudice. Acknowledging the six-month period for setting aside the judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section 473 had long passed, he argued relief was nevertheless proper because the boys’ mother had committed extrinsic fraud in asserting he was the father when in fact he was not, thus depriving him of a fair adversarial hearing.