People v. Johnson
Before: Yegan
100 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 20 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Sam MacKay JOHNSON Defendant and Appellant.
No. B138497. Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Six.
October 5, 2000. Review Denied January 24, 2001.[*] [545] George O. Benton, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Santa Rosa, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson, Supervising Deputy Attorney General,
David A. Wildman, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
YEGAN, J.
Sam MacKay Johnson appeals from the judgment entered following his no contest pleas to selling cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)) and possessing cocaine for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11351.5). Appellant admitted three prior prison terms (Pen.Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) as well as two prior juvenile adjudications and one prior felony conviction within the meaning of California's "Three Strikes" law (Pen.Code, §§ 667, subds.(b)(i), 1170.12). The juvenile adjudications were for residential burglary. Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, the trial court struck the juvenile adjudications and sentenced appellant to prison for 15 years, 8 months.
After appellant was sentenced, our Supreme Court held that a juvenile adjudication for residential burglary does not qualify as a "strike." (People v. Garcia (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 114, 980 P.2d 829.) Appellant alleges that he would not have entered his pleas and admissions had his counsel informed him that the juvenile adjudications were not valid "strikes." He contends that counsel was ineffective in failing to anticipate the Garcia decision. We affirm.[1]
Discussion
A defendant who pleads guilty and admits an enhancement is not entitled to withdraw his plea and admission because a subsequent judicial decision has reduced the maximum penalty for the charged offense and enhancement. As the United States Supreme Court has indicated, "a voluntary plea of guilty intelligently made in the light of the then applicable law does not become vulnerable because later judicial decisions indicate that the plea rested
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