DISCUSSION 1. Motion for Continuance English argues that the denial of his motion for a continuance on the day before trial was an abuse of discretion and a violation of his rights to counsel and due process. The Attorney General argues the contrary. After making a motion for a continuance, English's attorney represented to the court that not until the day before trial was he able to give her "any direction as to how to locate" potential witnesses to testify on his behalf. Noting his denial of any participation in the assault, she asked for a continuance so an investigator could "track down" those witnesses. Finding no showing either of reasonable diligence to procure the attendance of those witnesses or of materiality of the proposed testimony of those witnesses, the court noted 100 jury summons had gone out to people who had made "arrangements to be off work and away from their families for the rest of the week" and denied the motion. No mechanical tests exist for deciding when a denial of a motion for a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process, so the answer lies "in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied." (Ungarv. Sarafite (1964) 376 U.S. 575, 589 [11 L.Ed.2d 921, 84 S.Ct. 841].) Since "broad discretion must be granted trial courts on matters of continuances," nothing short of "an unreasoning and arbitrary `insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay'" violates the right to counsel. (Morris v. Slappy (1983) 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 [75 L.Ed.2d 610, 103 S.Ct. 1610].) Only a showing *Page 1220 of an abuse of discretion and prejudice to the defense suffices to reverse a judgment on the basis of a denial of a motion for a continuance. (People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795,840 [64 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2]; People v.Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 829, 843 [248 Cal.Rptr. 444,755 P.2d 894].) English fails to make the requisite showing. The evidence of his guilt was as overwhelming as his reasons for a continuance were conclusory. 2. Aggravated Term English argues that imposition of the aggravated term without jury findings on circumstances in aggravation was a violation of his rights to due process and jury trial. The Attorney General argues the contrary. The probation officer's report noted no circumstances in mitigation (Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 4.423)2 but elaborated five circumstances in aggravation (Cal. Rules of Court, former rule 4.421 (former rule 4.421)): "(a) Facts relating to the crime, whether or not charged or chargeable as enhancements, including the fact that: [¶] . . . [¶] [(See former rule 4.421(a).)] "1. The defendant kicked the victim on her face while she was on the ground, which demonstrates a high degree of cruelty, viciousness and callousness. [(See former rule 4.421(a)(1).)] "3. The victim was highly intoxicated, with a BAC of .34%, and this along with the defendant's superior strength and history as an ex-boxer made her particularly vulnerable. [(See former rule 4.421(a)(3).)] "(b) Facts relating to the defendant, including the fact that: [(See former rule 4.421(b).)] "1. The defendant has engaged in violent conduct, which indicates a serious danger to society. [(See former rule 4.421(b)(1).)] "2. The defendant's prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness. [(See former rule 4.421(b)(2).)] "5. The defendant's prior performance on probation or parole was unsatisfactory. [(See former rule 4.421(b)(5).)]" *Page 1221 The probation officer's report documented English's long criminal career. Least serious were his two infractions for disturbing the peace. (§ 415.) Among his eight Vehicle Code misdemeanors were three DUI's and one reckless driving. (Veh. Code, §§ 23103, 23103.5, 23152, subd. (a).) His priors included six other misdemeanors — two for criminal threats (§ 422), two for battery (§ 242), and two for domestic violence (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) — and seven felonies — two for second degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b)) and one each for possession of stolen property (§ 496), vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), attempted burglary (§§ 459, 664), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). At the probation and sentencing hearing, the court made no reference to the circumstance in aggravation about English's "high degree of cruelty, viciousness, [and] callousness" (former rule 4.421(a)(1)) but found the other four true. The court carefully noted that each and every prior supporting the circumstance in aggravation for "numerous" priors (former rule 4.421(b)(2)) was different from each of the three priors for which the court was about to impose a consecutive one-year term each for grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), second degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b)), and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)): "The cases in which he was previously committed to prison aside, his prior convictions are still extremely numerous including four significant misdemeanor Vehicle Code violations and convictions for burglary, attempted burglary, receiving stolen property, spousal abuse, disturbing the peace, battery, criminal threats, battery, disturbing the peace, criminal threats, spousal abuse." No jury findings on the circumstance in aggravation for "numerous" priors (former rule 4.421(b)(2)) were required. "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt" (Apprendi v. NewJersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 [147 L.Ed.2d 435,120 S.Ct. 2348] (Apprendi), italics added) because the "`statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basisof the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted bythe defendant" (Blakely v. Washington (2004)542 U.S. 296, 303 [159 L.Ed.2d 403, 124 S.Ct. 2531], original italics). Apprendi's "fact of a prior conviction" exception arose in Almendarez-Torres v. United States (1998) 523 U.S. 224 [140 L.Ed.2d 350, 118 S.Ct. 1219], which held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not necessary for a prior conviction. (Id. at pp. 239-247.) After English's probation and sentencing hearing, the United States Supreme Court held that California's determinate sentencing law violates the federal constitutional right to a jury trial by permitting imposition of an *Page 1222 aggravated term on the basis of facts that a court finds true by a preponderance of the evidence instead of on the basis of facts that a jury finds true beyond a reasonable doubt. (Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S.___, ___ [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 864, 127 S.Ct. 856] (Cunningham), overruling People v. Black (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1238 [29 Cal.Rptr.3d 740, 113 P.3d 534], vacated sub nom. Blackv. California (2007) ___ U.S. ___ [167 L.Ed.2d 36,127 S.Ct. 1210].) Cunningham reaffirmedApprendi's "fact of a prior conviction" exception and noted: "A fact underlying an enhancement cannot do double duty" and "cannot be used to impose an upper term sentence and, on top of that, an enhanced term." (Cunningham, at p. ___ [166 L.Ed.2d at pp. 868-869, 127 S.Ct. at pp. 863-864], citing former § 1170, subd. (b)3 ["The court may not impose an upper term by using the fact of any enhancement upon which sentence is imposed under any provision of law."].) Here, the court rigorously complied with the law by using one set of priors for the circumstance in aggravation for numerous priors (former rule 4.421(b)(1)) and an entirely different set of priors for the three prison term prior enhancements (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). One valid circumstance in aggravation is sufficient to support imposition of an aggravated term. (People v. Cruz (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 427, 433-34 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 148].) English's plethora of priors abundantly supports the circumstance in aggravation for numerous priors. "It's safe to say" English "never met Will Rogers." (J. McMurtry (Sugar Hill Records 1997) "For All I Know.") The latest ugly chapter in the ongoing saga of his long criminal career shows that his live-in girlfriend lost consciousness after he inflicted "substantial injuries to her head and face" by slapping and punching her, throwing her against the wall and pushing her to the floor, and choking and kicking her. On those shocking facts, with not even a single circumstance in mitigation, there is no reasonable possibility that the court would have considered the middle term or the mitigated term appropriate for a person with his priors, with or without any other circumstance in aggravation. (See Peoplev. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 961, fn. 6 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237, 135 P.3d 649] [noting "substantial equivalency" of reasonable possibility and reasonable doubt formulations of harmless error], citing Fahy v. Connecticut (1963)375 U.S. 85, 86-87 [11 L.Ed.2d 171, 84 S.Ct. 229].) SinceCunningham error, if any, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we need not address the other three circumstances in aggravation. (See People v. Sayres (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1044-1046.) *Page 1223 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Vartabedian, Acting P. J., and Levy, J., concurred.