People v. Esqueda

Opinion

HUFFMAN, J.

Jose Oscar Esqueda was jury-convicted of second degree murder (Pen. Code,

1

§ 187, subd. (a)) by use of a firearm (§ 12022.5) for the death of Ana Castillo and of possessing a firearm silencer (§ 12520). The trial court sentenced him to a total 23 years to life term and imposed restitution fines under Government Code section 13967 for $5,000 and $1,000 for each crime, respectively.

Esqueda appeals from these convictions and his sentence, contending the trial court erred in permitting evidentiary use of his statements obtained in

[1455]

violation of

Miranda

v.

Arizona

(1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R.3d 974], in permitting evidentiary use of his coerced admissions in violation of his due process rights

(Spano

v.

New York

(1959) 360 U.S. 315, 324 [3 L.Ed.2d 1265, 1272, 79 S.Ct. 1202]), in permitting use of Ana’s inadmissible hearsay statements, in permitting use of a photographic display of his tattoos which suggested he was of bad character, in permitting the prosecutor to impeach him on collateral matters which contradicted his cross-examination trial testimony, and in separately imposing restitution fines for each count.

We affirm Esqueda’s conviction for possession of a silencer, but reverse on his murder conviction and set aside the accompanying true gun-use finding. As we explain below, we do so because we are confronted here with a distressing variation of the classic “Mutt and Jeff’ routine of police interrogation recognized in

Miranda

which, under the totality of circumstances in this case, amounts to a flagrant violation of Esqueda’s Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination and his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process. The court below should therefore have granted his pretrial motions to suppress his statements. Because their admission at trial was prejudicial by any applicable standard, we reverse the murder conviction in its entirety.