OPINION
SUMMARY Under a default judgment, a trial court declared a man was the father of a child and determined he was obligated to pay child support. After the man made child support payments, genetic testing determined he was not the father. Based on the test results, the man moved to set aside the paternity judgment and obtain reimbursement of support payments made. The court set aside the paternity judgment, but determined the man was not entitled to reimbursement under either the Family Code or case law. We likewise conclude that the statutory and decisional authority preclude reimbursement and, therefore, affirm the order. *Page 255 PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND In 1992, Tami Burton gave birth to a son, Tyler, and named appellant Taron Grant James as the child's father on the birth certificate. When Tyler was born, appellant was in the military service assigned to the Persian Gulf and was unaware of the child's birth. Burton subsequently sought child support payments through appellant's military benefits. Her request for child support was appellant's first notice of Tyler's birth.
Appellant denied he was Tyler's father. In response to Burton's request, the military informed her that in order to obtain child support, she and appellant would be required to undergo genetic testing. The military further informed Burton that appellant would be granted leave to participate in genetic testing following his return from the Persian Gulf. Despite appellants' offer to pay for the genetic testing, Burton never sought it. Instead, she requested child support benefits from the County of Los Angeles, naming appellant as Tyler's father.
In 1994, following Burton's application to receive child support benefits through the county, the district attorney filed a complaint to establish appellant's parental relationship with Tyler and his obligation to pay child support. Although the complaint was served on appellant, he failed to respond to it. As a result, a default judgment was entered in 1996 declaring appellant to be the father and ordering him to pay $121 a month in child support through the county. After judgment was entered, appellant made child support payments but continued to deny paternity and played no role in Tyler's life. Following entry of judgment, appellant filed three motions.
In 1997, appellant moved to set aside the default judgment, asserting he was not Tyler's father and had not been properly served, and requested genetic testing. The trial court found appellant was properly served and denied the genetic testing request.
In 2001, appellant and Tyler participated in genetic testing that determined appellant was not the father. Based on the test results, in July 2001 appellant moved to set aside the judgment and obtain reimbursement of the child support payments he had made through the county. In opposing the motion, the county asserted that appellant failed to prove the necessary extrinsic fraud to set aside the paternity judgment and the 1996 determination was res judicata as to the issue of paternity. In 2002, the county and appellant stipulated that the county was closing the case for any unassigned child support and arrearages, but appellant remained obligated to pay assigned arrearages. *Page 256
In 2006, appellant moved under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 to "renew" his two earlier motions, asserting thatCounty of Los Angeles v. Navarro (2004)120 Cal.App.4th 246 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 905] (Navarro) and Family Code section 7648.4 (section 7648.4) authorized reimbursement of child support payments. The court set aside the judgment of paternity, but denied reimbursement on the ground that neither section 7648.4 nor Navarro authorized reimbursement.
Appellant appeals from these orders on the grounds thatNavarro requires reimbursement, section 7648.4 does not preclude reimbursement, and Code of Civil Procedure section 1008 authorized "renewal" of his earlier motions.
DISCUSSION I. Standard of Review.
The issues presented are: first, whether a declared father who makes child support payments under a default judgment is entitled to reimbursement for those payments after a later determination that he is not the father; and second, whether appellant's motion for reconsideration was properly denied.
Because appellant's entitlement to reimbursement of child support payments turns on a question of law, the trial court's ruling denying reimbursement is reviewed de novo. (WesternGrowers Ins. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1993)16 Cal.App.4th 227, 233 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 26].) The ruling on a motion for reconsideration, on the other hand, is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. (Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1457 [45 Cal.Rptr.2d 695].)
II. Family Code section 7648.4 precludes reimbursement after a declared father is determined not to be the actual father.
Appellant argues an entitlement to reimbursement under the Family Code. We disagree.
Section 7648.4 does not permit a child support reimbursement order in favor of an erroneously declared father. Moreover, the section's legislative history reveals an intent to preclude a declared father from receiving reimbursement. Accordingly, we conclude that the Family Code does not authorize reimbursing appellant for child support payments made before genetic testing excluded him as the father. *Page 257
Section 7648.4 specifies the remedies available to a declared father who maintains he is not the actual father of a child and is not obligated to support the child. The section specifically addresses the issue of reimbursing a declared father who successfully set aside a previous judgment of paternity. It states, "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, if the court grants a motion to set aside or vacate a paternity judgment pursuant to this article, the court shall vacate any order for child support and arrearages issued on the basis of that previous judgment of paternity. The previously established father has no right of reimbursement for any amount of support paid prior to the granting of the motion." (§ 7648.4.) A plain reading of the statutory language precludes reimbursement.
Furthermore, the reading is consistent with the legislative intent underlying section 7648.4. The section was intended to protect a declared father who, under existing law, lacked the procedural means to set aside or vacate an existing paternity decree after genetic testing determined he was not the biological father. While the statutory change was designed to enable a declared father to challenge a paternity decree, it was also intended to safeguard the child. The Legislature considered granting a declared father the right to seek reimbursement from the mother, but concluded that reimbursement may adversely affect the mother's ability to financially provide for the child. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 252 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 4, 2003, pp. 1, 9.) In enacting section 7648.4, the Legislature was aware of the harm that paternity fraud inflicted on a declared father. Nevertheless, it sought to balance the competing interests of a declared father and a child, and concluded that a right of reimbursement should not be permitted. As a result, section 7648.4 precludes reimbursement.
Appellant further argues that section 7648.4 does not bar reimbursement where a declared father filed a motion to set aside the paternity decree before section 7648.4 was enacted. Appellant, in effect, urges the creation of a statutory exception to the reimbursement bar for a declared father who files a motion before the section's enactment. Implicit in the Legislature's determination that a declared father possessed "no procedural means" to challenge a paternity decree was a recognition that a father may have previously sought and failed to set aside that determination. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 252 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 4, 2003, p. 1.) Nevertheless, in the interest of protecting a child, it concluded that the paternity fraud victim was not entitled to seek reimbursement. Therefore, the statute bars reimbursement regardless of when a declared father moved to set aside a paternity decree. *Page 258 III. Navarro does not entitle a declared fatherto reimbursement.
In addition to seeking reimbursement under the Family Code, appellant argues that Navarro authorizes reimbursement. Navarro, decided approximately four months before section 7648.4 was enacted, granted relief to a declared father on equitable grounds. Navarro had consistently denied paternity and any relationship with the child. (Navarro, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 248.) He later moved to set aside a default judgment because genetic testing performed in a separate paternity action determined he was not the biological father. The County of Los Angeles acknowledged the erroneous paternity determination, but nonetheless opposed Navarro's motion. This Division conceded that, under a strict application of the law, relief should be denied on the ground that Navarro's motion to set aside the default judgment was untimely. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, the trial court's decision denying Navarro's motion was reversed on equitable grounds. We expressed the view that "[s]ometimes even more important policies than the finality of judgments are at stake," noting that mistakes in a child support action should be corrected rather than exploited. (Id. at p. 249.)Navarro held that a paternity decree may be set aside if later genetic testing excludes a declared father as the biological father. (Ibid.)
Navarro, however, does not stand for the proposition that an erroneously declared father is entitled to reimbursement. Reimbursement was not an issue in the case. Navarro had simply moved to set aside a prior judgment. BecauseNavarro does not stand for the proposition that a declared father is entitled to reimbursement, appellant's reliance on the case is misguided.
IV. Appellant may not "renew" prior motions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (b).
Finally, appellant asserts an entitlement to "renew" his 1997 and 2001 motions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008, subdivision (b). In relevant part, the section states, "[a] party who originally made an application for an order which was refused in whole or part, or granted conditionally or on terms, may make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law." (Code of Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (b).) Appellant contends that new law in the form of section 7648.4 and Navarro authorizes reimbursement and that genetic testing results provide new facts. Due to the purported new law and facts, he argues the trial court should have reconsidered his previous motions and granted his reimbursement request. *Page 259
The trial court denied the motion for reconsideration determining that appellant failed to cite any statutory or decisional authority entitling him to reimbursement. We likewise conclude that neither section 7648.4 norNavarro authorizes reimbursement. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant's request for reconsideration.
DISPOSITION The order denying reimbursement is affirmed.
Cooper, P. J., and Rubin, J., concurred.