People v. Perez
Before: Moore
126 Cal.Rptr.2d 505 (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 203 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Gerardo PEREZ, Defendant and Appellant.
No. G028325. Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division Three.
October 29, 2002. As Modified on Denial of Rehearing November 21, 2002. Review Granted January 22, 2003. [506] Michael Ian Garey, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Garrett Beaumont and David Delgado-Rucci, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MOORE, J.
A jury convicted defendant Gerardo Perez of possession of products containing hydriodic acid with intent to manufacture methamphetamine (Health & Saf.Code, § 11383, subd. (c)(2); count one) and possession of 28.5 grams or less of marijuana (Health & Saf.Code, § 11357, subd. (b); count two). The court imposed a two-year prison sentence.
Defendant contends the prosecution improperly relied on the theory he aided and abetted another person who intended to manufacture methamphetamine. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to otherwise prove he possessed products containing hydriodic acid with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Finally, he claims the trial court erred by instructing the jury in accordance with the prosecution's aiding and abetting theory, admitting certain statements in violation of the corpus delicti rule and his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694), and improperly limiting the scope of his counsel's closing argument.
The court erred by giving instructions on aider and abettor liability since the facts adduced at trial did not support the prosecution's theory. The prosecution's coequal reliance on two theories of liability, one of which was not supported by the evidence, mandates reversal of the cause for a new trial. Our conclusion obviates the need to discuss defendant's contentions concerning the corpus delicti rule, admission of pre-Miranda statements to police, the scope of counsel's closing argument, and the sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, the judgment is reversed as to count one and the cause remanded for a new trial.
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