People v. Bracken

99 Cal.Rptr.2d 481 (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Ron Paul BRACKEN, Defendant and Appellant.

No. BR39807. Appellate Division, Superior Court, Los Angeles County.

June 27, 2000. Michael Norris, Inc., and Michael Norris, Redondo Beach, for Defendant and Appellant.

Gil Garcetti, District Attorney, Patrick D. Moran and Juliet Schmidt, Deputy District Attorneys, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT

BEVERLY, J.

Appellant Ron Paul Bracken was charged with a violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a) (driving under the influence) with an allegation that he refused to submit to a chemical test, in violation of Vehicle Code former section 23159. Prior to trial, appellant made a motion to suppress evidence. Following [482] the denial of the motion, he pleaded nolo contendere.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding that reasonable suspicion can be based on a single factor involving wholly lawful conduct.

Our standard of review concerning a motion to suppress was settled by the Supreme Court in People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591,174 Cal.Rptr. 867, 629 P.2d 961. In Leyba, the high court explained an appellate court first finds the facts relating to the challenged search. Since Penal Code section 1538.5 vests this power in the trial court, "`[o]n appeal all presumptions favor the exercise of that power, and the trial court's findings on such matters, whether express or implied, must be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence.'" (People v. Leyba, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 596-597, 174 Cal. Rptr. 867, 629 P.2d 961.) The second step of appellate review is to "`measure the facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness.' [Citation.] On that issue, in short, the appellate court exercises its independent judgment." (Id. at p. 597, 174 Cal.Rptr. 867, 629 P.2d 961.)

"[A] police officer can legally stop a motorist only if the facts and circumstances known to the officer support at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver has violated the Vehicle Code or some other law. [Citations.]" (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 917, 926, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 785.)