People v. Artis

Opinion

WORK, J.

The People appeal a judgment of dismissal after the court determined an embezzlement by a tenant could not be charged under Penal Code

1

section 484, the general theft statute, because the rule that a specific statute controls over general statutes requires prosecutors to charge such offenses as violations of section 507. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment.

I

After Chester Criton Artis sold a refrigerator he took without permission from the apartment he was renting, he was charged with petty theft with a

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prior conviction of a theft-related offense. (§§ 484/666.) After being held to answer, the court granted his motion to set aside the information (§ 995) on the ground his crime could not be charged under the general theft statute because it factually fell within a specific statute defining tenant conversions as embezzlements (§ 507).

In

People

v.

Dingle

(1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 21, 29-30 [219 Cal.Rptr. 707], we reviewed the significance of section 490a which states: “Wherever any law or statute of this state refers to or mentions larceny, embezzlement, or stealing, said law or statute shall hereafter be read and interpreted as if the word ‘theft’ were substituted therefor.” There, we concluded that the burglary (§ 459) statute’s requirement of an entry to commit larceny, must be interpreted as if the stated requisite intent were

theft,

regardless of how defined. Thus, an entry to obtain telephone services by deception, otherwise defined by section 502.7, could be properly charged as burglary.

Here, the issue is whether tenants who fraudulently convert property with which they have been intrusted may be charged with theft under the general provisions of section 484 or only by the specific statute factually defining that offense.