People v. Green

Opinion

NOTT, J.

In the latter part of 1994, appellant Reginald Green was convicted by a jury of selling rock cocaine to an undercover police officer (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)). Following a jury waiver, prior convictions for petty theft with a prior and first degree burglary were found true by the trial court.

[282]

Since the prior burglary conviction qualified as a “first strike” under the recently enacted “three strikes” statutes, the trial court sentenced appellant to six years in state prison as follows: (1) the low term of three years, which was doubled pursuant to Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (b) through (i)

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and (2) a total of two years consecutive under section 667.5, subdivision (b) for the two prior convictions, which was ordered stayed under the authority of section 1385.

Issue

The prior burglary conviction occurred in 1987. Appellant contends that the “three strikes” law does not apply to convictions incurred before its enactment.

Discussion

The crux of this appeal involves the interpretation of section 667, subdivision (d)(1). Therefore, we will first set forth the principles which will guide us.

As was recently stated by our Supreme Court, “In construing a statute, our principal task is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature. [Citation.] We do so by first turning to the words themselves, giving them their ordinary meaning. [Citations.] Of course, ‘ “ ‘language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.’ ” ’ [Citation.] In such circumstances, ‘[t]he intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.’ [Citation.]”

(People

v.

Broussard

(1993) 5 Cal.4th 1067, 1071 [22 Cal.Rptr. 278, 856 P.2d 1134].)