Betsworth v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board

[588]

Opinion

SILLS, P. J.

Introduction

“Fair trials,” wrote Hugo Black, “are too important a part of our free society to let prosecuting judges be trial judges of the charges they prefer.”

(In re Murchison

(1955) 349 U.S. 133, 137 [99 L.Ed. 942, 947, 75 S.Ct. 623].) One does not need to go to law school to know, as Black wrote in the same opinion, that “. . . no man can be a judge in his own case.”

(Id.

at p. 136 [99 L.Ed. at p. 946].)

The area of the law where judges are most likely to end up presiding over their own cases is contempt of court, where they will be both prosecutor and judge. The justification is practical necessity. Judges must act swiftly to protect court proceedings from disruption or one party’s attempt to gain an unfair advantage (see e.g.,

Codispoti

v.

Pennsylvania

(1974) 418 U.S. 506, 513 [41 L.Ed.2d 912, 920, 94 S.Ct. 2687] [summary contempt power based on need to protect the “integrity of the trial process in the face of an ‘actual obstruction of justice’ ”]), and there may not be enough time to send for another judge to conduct a minitrial on every such disruption or attempt.

On the other hand, not every contempt of court strikes at the

process

of justice. The kind of conduct which is most popularly associated with contempt of court — disrespect or discourteous behavior toward a judge — sometimes does not disrupt court proceedings or require instant action. The judge may

wait

to deal with the disrespect until the end of the trial, or even later.

But this time lag brings us back to the judge-in-your-own-cause problem. The pressing necessity to act summarily as both prosecutor and judge is gone because there is no ongoing process to protect. (See