Grinstead v. Krushkhov
Before: Agee
AGEE, J.
Plaintiff appeals from the judgment entered upon an adverse jury verdict in a personal injury action arising out of a two-car intersection collision. The facts are stated in the light most favorable to the defendants. For convenience the driver of defendants’ ear will be referred to as the defendant.
Grant Street and 16th Avenue intersect each other at right angles. Grant runs north and south; 16th runs east and west. Signs at the northeast and southwest corners require vehicular traffic on 16th to stop before entering Grant, which is a through street.
Defendant was proceeding south on Grant in her Morris Minor automobile shortly before noon on a Saturday. She was bringing her young daughter home from a music lesson.
Plaintiff was riding in a Buick being driven by her husband in a westerly direction on 16th. It went by the stop sign on the northeast corner at a speed estimated by defendant to be approximately 40 miles per hour. Defendant had not seen the Buick before she entered the intersection because of ears parked on the north side of 16th to the east of Grant and the Buick was then over 40 to 50 feet from the intersection.
Defendant testified that “as soon as I realized this car was coming and it was coming fast, I stepped on my brakes and swerved to the right to possibly get out of his way.” De
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fendant was then going 15 miles per hour. Her car travelled approximately 10 feet from that point to the point of impact. The front of her Morris Minor came in contact with the right rear fender and rear bumper of the Buiek.
Defendant stated that she panicked but did the best she could in the split second that she had to act. She reaffirmed her deposition testimony that “All I felt was that I noticed a split second of panicky feeling he is coming too fast and I wouldn’t have a chance to get away. ’ ’
It can reasonably be contended that if defendant, upon being confronted with the situation described, had swerved to her left instead of swerving to her right, the collision might have been avoided. There was nothing in or near the intersection which would have prevented such action on her part. She thus had a choice of which course to take.
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