Yorty v. Los Angeles City Council
Before: Jefferson
JEFFERSON, J.
Petitioner, the Mayor of the City of Los Angeles, sought a peremptory writ of mandate compelling respondent, the City Council of Los Angeles, to provide sufficient funds for the fiscal year 1963-1964 to cover the salaries of all personnel authorized in the office of’ petitioner by Ordi
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nance Number 124,766; in the alternative, petitioner asked that the court declare that respondent was dutybound to provide funds to pay these salaries. The court below denied the petition for a peremptory writ of mandate and sustained a demurrer to each count alleged, without leave to amend, the court having determined that petitioner was not entitled to declaratory relief. This i's an appeal from the judgment.
The bone of contention surrounding the present action is that, over the mayor’s veto, the city council adopted a budget for the now passed fiscal year 1963-1964 which did not allow the mayor sufficient funds to pay the salaries of all personnel previously authorized for his office in Ordinance No. 124,766. Funds totaling $286,491 were requested by the mayor to pay the salaries of bis staff. However, $63,600 was trimmed from this amount in the budget finally passed by the city council, leaving a balance of $222,891.
The petition alleges, as a first cause of action, that the city council, by Ordinance No. 124,766, created and authorized 26 regular positions and five substitute positions in the office of the petitioner; the budget for the fiscal year 1963-1964, however, provided funds sufficient to pay the salaries for only 22 of these positions; the city council’s action in refusing to appropriate the additional funds was arbitrary and capricious and motivated by a desire to punish and oppress the mayor; because of respondent’s refusal, petitioner is unable to carry out the work of the office of the mayor.
In the alternative, petitioner alleges as a second cause of action, that a controversy exists respecting the rights and duties of the parties under the city charter concerning the requirement to provide funds for the operation of the office of the mayor. Petitioner takes the view that the charter imposes upon the city council a duty to provide sufficient sums for the payment of reasonable salaries for all positions on the mayor’s staff established by the council. Ordinance No. 124,766, it is alleged, was a legislative determination that all positions created and authorized under that ordinance are necessary to the proper functioning of the office of the mayor; that it could not be rescinded merely by the council’s refusal to provide the required funds. Respondent, on the other hand, the petition alleges, takes the position that the enactment is not a legislative determination as to the necessity of the positions it authorizes; that, in any event, the failure to allocate funds for these positions constituted a legislative rescission of any previous determination in that
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