Miller v. City of Bakersfield

California Court of Appeal Dec 11, 1967 No. Civ. 824Published

Before: Stone

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Holding. The court held that the plaintiff's action for damages was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because the underlying constitutional issues had been fully litigated and decided in a prior action, and the plaintiff's attempt to challenge the prior judgment constituted an impermissible collateral attack.

Issues

Whether the doctrine of res judicata bars a subsequent action for damages against city officials who were not parties to a prior action involving the same subject matter.
Whether a plaintiff may collaterally attack a final judgment in a separate action for damages based on allegations of an unfair trial in the prior proceeding.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The fact the individual defendants here were not parties to the first action does not prevent them from joining with the City of Bakersfield in asserting the defense of res judicata.”

“Since appellant’s action is for damages, and not an action in equity, it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on a final judgment.”

STONE, J.

Plaintiff Milton Miller, individually and as trustee of the Hotel Padre Trust, appeals from a judgment entered pursuant to an order sustaining demurrer without leave to amend. The demurrer alleged that the judgment in a prior action,

City of Bakersfield

Miller,

64 Cal.2d 93 [48 Cal.Rptr. 889, 410 P.2d 393], is res judicata. This action and the prior action arose out of the enforcement by the city of building code provisions enacted long after the construction of appellant’s building. The facts surrounding the transaction are fully set forth in the Supreme Court opinion, at page 96 et seq. Insofar as the matter before us is concerned, the pertinent fact is that at the time appellant answered and filed a cross-complaint in the city’s action against him, he also filed this separate action against the city and certain city officials for damages alleged to have been suffered by reason of enforcement of the Uniform Building Code adopted by the City of Bakersfield.

Appellant’s charging allegations all rest on the premise that application of building code requirements to buildings constructed prior to the adoption of the code is unconstitutional. Upon this basis he alleges that the posting by city officials or city employees of notices on his property that the building did not meet designated requirements of the building code, and of a notice to vacate certain parts of the building, were illegal acts (which caused him damage. All of the acts about which appellant complains were executed in carrying out the city’s abatement action and in the enforcement of the building code.

The record reflects that the legal basis for every allegation made by appellant in his complaint, that is, every issue raised in this action for damages, was- fully litigated and decided

[822]

adversely to him in

City of Bakersfield

Miller, supra.

The upshot of the Supreme Court’s opinion is: “We conclude that the city acted within its constitutional and statutory powers in enacting and enforcing the ordinance and that the resultant judgment deprives defendant of no constitutionally protected right.” (P. 96.) “The substantive provisions of the code deprive defendant of no right protected by the Constitution, and it is clearly within the statutory powers of the city to declare that buildings violating the ordinance in ways which directly affect the health and safety of the public are public nuisances. Therefore, the trial court did not err in ordering that the nuisance be abated. The cross-complaint, in which defendant sought relief from the posting of signs on his premises without an opportunity to be heard, was properly dismissed. The trial itself constituted a public hearing on the matter.” (P. 104.)

Miller v. City of Bakersfield

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STONE, J.

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