People v. Renfro

GARGANO, J.

After trial without a jury appellant, Nolan Ray Renfro, was found guilty of the crime of grand theft in violation of section 484 of the Penal Code. He appeals from the judgment of conviction which was entered thereon.

Defendant does not deny the theft for which he stands convicted. In fact, he freely and voluntarily admitted that he was involved in the theft of some telephone wire in El Dorado County in the area of Shingle Springs. Moreover, the evidence produced against him convincingly establishes that on March 1, 1966, appellant stole two types of telephone cable from the storage yard of the Pacific Telephone

&

Telegraph Company in Shingle Springs. He contends, however, that the evidence as to the value of this cable was inadmissible and that the prosecution did not prove value in excess of $200 beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, he concludes that under Penal Code section 1097 he could only be convicted of petty theft. This section reads as follows:

“When it appears that the defendant has committed a public offense, and there is reasonable ground of doubt in which of two or more degrees he is guilty, he can be convicted of the lowest of such degrees only. ’’

We will consider appellant’s contention, while bearing in mind that the test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, as appellant seems to assume, but whether there is substantial evidence to support the trier of the fact

(People

v.

Daugherty,

40 Cal.2d 876 [256 P.2d 911] (cert, den., 346 U.S. 827 [98 L.Ed. 352, 74 S.Ct. 47]) ;

People

v.

Robillard,

55 Cal.2d 88 [10 Cal.Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 295, 83 A.L.R.2d 1086] (cert, den., 365 U.S. 886 [6 L.Ed. 199, 81 S.Ct. 1043])). As the court stated in

People

v.

Hillery,

62 Cal.2d 692, 702 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382] :

“Moreover ‘It is the trier of fact, not the appellate court, that must be convinced of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.’ ”