Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hsu

[826]

DRAPER, P. J.

The question here is whether the one-year statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proe., § 340, subd. 3, or the two-year provision (Code Civ. Proe., § 339, subd. 1), applies to an action for malicious prosecution.

Plaintiff department sued to recover costs of care of defendants, husband and wife, during their separate commitments to Napa State Hospital. Defendants cross-complained, joining with the department, its director, the hospital, its superintendent and three resident physicians, and the two medical examiners who recommended commitment. Dismissal followed sustaining of demurrers without leave to amend, and cross-complainants appeal.

The cross-complaint, filed in propria persona, concerns only the commitment of Mr. Hsu. The parties agree in treating it as attempting to state a cause of action for malicious prosecution.

Mr. Hsu’s alleged commitment, release, and discharge all occurred more than one year but less than two years before filing of the cross-complaint. We have concluded that the statute of limitations applicable to an action for malicious prosecution is one year, and that the demurrer upon this ground was properly sustained. Thus we do not consider the several other grounds of demurrer.

Until 1905, no California statute provided specifically for a time to commence actions for infringement of personal rights other than libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or seduction, which were specifically listed in section 340, subdivision 3. Thus actions for bodily injury and for infringement upon other personal rights fell within the two-year limitation of section 339 as actions “upon a . . . liability not founded upon an instrument of writing”

(Piller

v.

Southern Pacific R.R. Co.,

52 Cal. 42;

McCusker

v.

Walker,

77 Cal. 208, 212 [19 P. 382] ;