Harper v. Knight

STEEL, J.,

pro tem.

Defendants appeal from a judgment in favor of plaintiff and respondent in an action for damages for personal injuries. The action was tried by the court sitting without a jury, and a judgment in the sum of $3,000 was rendered.

This appeal presents but one question, viz.: Was plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law?

The facts are simple, and may be briefly stated as follows: The action was the result of an automobile collision occurring at the intersection of Lassen and Laurel Streets, in Willows, California. Respondent was driving easterly on Laurel Street, and as he approached said intersection he observed an automobile traveling southerly on" Lassen Street approaching the intersection. Respondent slowed down, shifting his car into second gear, applied the brakes, and brought the car

almost

to a stop, thus permitting the other car to pass through the intersection in front of him. Respondent continued in an easterly direction to cross the street at a speed of approximately three miles per hour. At the time respondent slowed down and shifted into second gear, he observed a milk truck owned by defendant Knight, and being operated by defendant Vieira, also approaching the intersection from the north on Lassen Street, at a distance estimated to be from sixty to one hundred feet from the north curb-line of the intersection, and traveling along the left or east side of the center of the street at a speed esti

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mated by respondent to be between twenty-five and thirty-five miles per hour, and by appellant Vieira, to be fifteen miles per hour. Appellant Vieira did not slacken the speed of his car, but continued along its course and collided with the ear of respondent in the southeast quarter of the intersection, causing the injuries complained of.

Appellants contend that the act of respondent in bringing his car almost to a stop before proceeding across the intersection, had the effect of yielding the right of way to the first southbound car, and that the same act indicated he was likewise yielding the same right to the second car; that, therefore, his subsequent act in proceeding across the intersection ahead of appellants’ advancing car constitutes negligence as a matter of law.