Bowers v. Department of Employment

PEEK, J.

This proceeding arises out of a labor dispute existing at petitioner’s ranch in Butte County. On August 1, 1960, the Organizing Committee of the AFL-CIO picketed petitioner’s ranch. Thereafter when he sought the referral of agricultural workers for employment at his ranch respondents refused, basing such refusal upon the ground that under the provisions of the Wagner-Peyser Act, 48 United States Statutes 113, 29 U.S.C.A., section 49, the existence of the labor dispute forbade referrals. On August 3, 1960,

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he filed his “Petition for Writ of Mandate and for Temporary Restraining Order” in the superior court of said county. By that petition he sought an order of the court commanding respondents to refer available agricultural workers to him for employment and further sought the issuance of a provisional interim order that the respondents refrain from refusing to refer available workers. Thereafter the trial court issued its alternative writ of mandate and a temporary restraining order. On the following day, August 4, respondents moved the trial court to dissolve the temporary order, which motion was denied. At the same hearing the court issued a temporary injunction which commanded the respondents to “refer available agricultural workers to petitioner as in said Petition prayed” and restrained them from “failing or refusing to refer available agricultural workers to petitioner.” Thereupon respondents appealed from said injunctive order. On August 5 respondents filed a petition for a writ of supersedeas wherein they sought to stay enforcement of the preliminary injunction pending determination of the appeal. On the same day this court issued its order noticing said petition for hearing on August 8. At that hearing respondents made two major contentions: (1) That the order of the trial court, being mandatory in character, its operation was automatically stayed by the taking of the appeal; and (2) that by reason of the time element and the nature of the controversy this court should also in effect determine the appeal on its merits; that is, the respondents sought a ruling by this court at this time that the action of respondents in refusing to refer agricultural workers under the existing conditions was in accordance with valid rules and regulations as set forth in appropriate provisions of said Wagner-Peyser Act and the rules and regulations thereunder adopted by the United States Secretary of Labor pursuant thereto.