Davison v. Industrial Accident Commission

FLEMING, J.

The issue is one of statutory construction of the penalty provision for delay in the payment of workmen’s compensation. (Lab. Code, § 5814.) Petitioner seeks to annul an order of the commission denjdng her request for the imposition of a second penalty.

In 1962 petitioner sustained injuries in the course of her employment and was awarded temporary disability benefits, medical treatment, and medical-legal costs.

In June 1964 she was awarded continuing temporary disability benefits of $41.32 per week, further medical treatment, reimbursement for self-procured medical treatment, and additional medical-legal costs.

In October 1964 petitioner secured the imposition of a 10 percent penalty for unreasonable delay in the furnishing of medical treatment, an award which increased her weekly disability benefits by $4.13 to $45.45.

In April 1965 petitioner requested a second 10 percent penalty for further unreasonable delay in furnishing the medical treatment ordered in June 1964, and sought to have her temporary disability benefits increased by $4.55 to $50 weekly ($45.45 plus $4.55). The commission determined that under the statute only one 10 percent penalty for delinquency could be imposed, even if further unreasonable delay followed the imposition of a prior penalty. It suggested that petitioner’s remedy for the employer’s unreasonable delay in providing medical treatment was to procure it herself and seek reimbursement from her employer. We granted review.

[17]

Labor Code, section 5814, reads: “When payment of compensation has been unreasonably delayed or refused, either prior or subsequent to the issuance of an award, the full amount of the order, decision or award shall be increased by 10 percent. The question of delay and the reasonableness of the cause therefor shall be determined by the appeals board [formerly “commission”] in accordance with the facts. Such delay or refusal shall constitute good cause under Section 5803 to rescind, alter or amend the order, decision or award for the purpose of making the increase provided for herein. ’ ’

The sole question before us is whether the statute authorizes more than one 10 percent penalty in a single proceeding. Petitioner argues the statute is remedial and should be liberally construed, that its language does not restrict it to a single penalty, and that the statute requires multiple penalties in order to carry out the purposes of the act. Respondents argue the statute contains no specific language authorizing successive penalties, that it is penal in nature and should be strictly construed, and that a principle of strict construction rejects any imposition of penalties by implication.