Copeland v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control

FORD, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment denying a peremptory writ of mandate in a proceeding brought to review the order of the respondent Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control that the on-sale beer license of the petitioners be revoked

1

because of the conviction on or about March 10, 1961, of the petitioner Copeland of three counts of violation of section 476a of the Penal Code.

2

The action of the respondent was taken pursuant to the provision of section 24200, subdivision (d), of the Business and Professions Code whereunder a ground constituting a basis for the suspension or revocation of such a license is the “plea, verdict, or judgment of guilty to any public offense involving moral turpitude.”

The petitioners make two contentions. One is that the offenses of which the petitioner Copeland was convicted did not inherently and necessarily involve moral turpitude and, consequently, the order cannot stand because the respondent did not consider the circumstances of the offenses and thereupon make a determination as to whether moral turpitude was involved. The second contention is that, in any event, there

[188]

was no basis for the order because, prior to the hearing of the accusation against the petitioners, as to each charge the petitioner Copeland was released from “all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime” of which she was convicted pursuant to the provisions of section 1203.4 of the Penal Code.

3

The petitioners' position is untenable. One essential element of the crime of which the petitioner Copeland was convicted is the intent to defraud.

(People

v.

Rush,

172 Cal.App.2d 431, 434-435 [341 P.2d 788].) Consequently, that crime is a public offense involving moral turpitude.

(In re Hallinan,