Riley v. Peters

[297]

TOBRINER, J.

This appeal from a judgment quieting title to real property raises the single issue whether appellants, holders of mechanics ’ liens on the property, who have failed in their lien foreclosure actions to join as parties the trustee under a deed of trust or to join the subsequent owners under that deed, can prevail over such owners after the expiration of the statutory period for foreclosure of the liens. We believe that such failure precludes appellants from claiming priority over such owners, the respondents in this action.

After foreclosure of a deed of trust, recorded June 20, 1957, the trustee executed and delivered to respondents on June 2, 1959, a trustee’s deed which was recorded on June 4, 1959. Prior to the June 20th date, appellants, and other defendants, had furnished materials and commenced construction work on the involved property. Appellants and the other named defendants filed separate claims of lien and obtained judgments against the then owners for the materials furnished and work performed on the property. Appellants did not join either respondents or the trustee under the deed of trust as parties to any of the actions to foreclose their mechanics’ liens. None of the judgments have been paid and the “time for filing an action by the mechanic’s lien claimants . . . for the foreclosure thereof as against the . . . [respondents] has expired.”

Respondents brought this action to quiet title to the property as against appellants and the other defendants; the trial court rendered judgment for respondents.

As to mechanics’ liens, section 1188.1 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides in part as follows "The liens provided for in this chapter . . . are preferred to any lien, mortgage, deed of trust, or other encumbrance . . . which may have attached subsequent to the time when the . . . improvement ... in connection with which the lien claimant has done his work or furnished his material was commenced. ...” Section 1198.1 concerns the duration of liens and states: “No lien . . . binds any property for a longer period than 90 days after the same has been filed . . . unless within that time, proceedings to enforce the same be commenced in a proper court.” (As amended Stats. 1959, ch. 1176, p. 3261, § 1.)

The parties concede that since appellants had commenced work prior to the recording of the deed of trust, appellants’ liens prevail over the deed of trust through which respondents obtained their interest. The sole issue, therefore, may be thus stated: Is commencement of an action against only the owner, and not also against the trustee or the subsequent holder under