Spencer v. Young

COUGHLIN, J.

The plaintiffs, who are the respondents herein, were injured as the result of an accident which occurred when the automobile in which they were riding was struck in the rear by an automobile driven by the defendant, who is the appellant herein; on account thereof, brought this action for damages against the defendant, which was tried by a jury that rendered verdicts in their favor, awarding the plaintiff Spencer the sum of $700 and the plaintiff Heaton the sum of $670, upon which judgment was entered; and moved for a new trial upon the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdicts, contending that the award of damages was inadequate. By a written order, the trial court granted the motion for a new trial “upon the grounds of the

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insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdicts,” from which the defendant has appealed; and the issue thus presented is whether the order so made constitutes an abuse of discretion.

It is “the settled rule that the granting of a motion for a new trial rests within the discretion of the trial judge to such an extent that an appellate court will not interfere unless an abuse of discretion clearly appears.”

(Ballard

v.

Pacific Greyhound Lines,

28 Cal.2d 357, 358 [170 P.2d 465];

Yarrow

v.

State,

53 Cal.2d 427, 434 [348 P.2d 687].) Where the ground for such a motion is the insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict “it is the exclusive province of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, to determine the probative force of testimony and to weigh the evidence, and it may draw reasonable inferences therefrom opposed to those drawn by the” jury

(Yarrow

v.

State, supra,

53 Cal.2d 427, 434) ; and an appellate court will not reverse an order granting a motion for a new trial on this ground unless “it can be said as a matter of law that there is no substantial evidence to support a contrary judgment.”