Peck v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board

WAPNER, J. pro tem.

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Petitioner seeks annulment of a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board, after reconsideration, which set aside an award issued by a referee and denied her claim for compensation. We have concluded that the decision must be annulled for failure of the appeals board to state the evidence relied upon and specify in detail the reasons for its action, as required by section 5908.5

1

of the Labor Code.

[450]

Applicant, a secretary, claimed that back surgery which she underwent on March 7, 1967, with attendant medical treatment, hospital care and temporary disability, was required as a result of the acceleration, aggravation and lighting up of a preexisting asymptomatic nonindustrial condition by a fall at work on September 12, 1966. Respondents contended that the surgery was required because of an incomplete fusion of her spine following a prior disc surgery in June of 1965 and/or a nonindustrial injury in an automobile accident on October 31, 1966.

The referee found that the combined effects of the industrial incident and the automobile accident caused the need for the surgery, apportioned two-thirds of liability to industrial causes and one-third to nonindustrial causes, and issued award imposing liability on respondents for two-thirds of the medical and hospital expenses and two-thirds of normal temporary disability indemnity. The appeals board granted respondents’ petition for reconsideration, vacated the award, found that applicant did not sustain an industrial injury, and issued award limited to medical-legal costs. Applicant’s subsequent petition for reconsideration was denied.

The written opinion of the appeals board, required by Labor Code section 5908.5, states: “We have carefully reviewed the record in this matter. At the time of her injury on September 12, 1966, applicant was asymptomatic to the incomplete fusion of the cervical spine, as a result of the previous operation. She was not disabled by the injury of September 12, 1966. On October 31, 1966, she was involved in a non-industrial automobile accident and subsequently became disabled. It is our opinion after our review of the record that she sustained no industrial injury as a result of her accident of September 12, 1966, and that her self-procured medical treatment is attributable to her pre-existing condition which was aggravated by the non-industrial accident. ’ ’