People v. One 1960 Mercedes Benz Roadster

AGEE, J.

On June 9, 1961, the defendant motor vehicle was used unlawfully to transport narcotics. Such use was without the knowledge of its owner, Carfagni. One Santiago, who was on parole for a narcotics offense and was living in Carfagni’s home, was using the vehicle with the express permission of the latter. Santiago and an accomplice held up a pharmacy and Santiago drove away in the vehicle with cash and narcotics obtained in the holdup. Forfeiture proceedings resulted in a judgment being entered on November 13, 1961, forfeiting said vehicle to the State of California. Carfagni appeals from the judgment.

The sole contention on appeal is that the forfeiture statute (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11610-11629), in particular sections

11621 and 11622, is unconstitutional as being in violation of the equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 13 and 21, of the Constitution of the State of California.

The gravamen of the argument is that the statute unreasonably discriminates between the registered owner of a vehicle and one who merely holds a security interest, in that the latter is not held to account for the strict penalties exacted therein of an owner.

Section 11610 provides that the interest of any registered owner of a vehicle used to unlawfully transport any narcotic shall be forfeited to the state. Sections 11621 and 11622 exempt lienholders from forfeiture of their right, title and interest in seized vehicles, and provide for restoration of such vehicles to them under certain conditions.

The Legislature has thus classified owners of automobiles for purposes of forfeiture into two different categories, (1) registered owners and (2) legal owners holding a bona fide lien.

Appellant states: “There is no doubt that control of the evil of narcotics traffic is a proper subject for the Legislature. It is one on which it can validly exercise its police powers to preserve the health, safety and good order of society.” But, continues appellant, “there remains the principal issue here of the propriety and reasonableness of the classification, ...” And, adds appellant, “any classification must be reasonable.” We agree with these principles, but we disagree with appel

[844]