Stirton v. Pastor
Before: Monroe
MONROE, J. pro tem.
*
The plaintiffs and appellants brought an action to vacate and set aside a sale of real estate by trustee pursuant to power of sale in a deed of trust. Answer was filed and application for a summary judgment was made, supported by affidavits. The motion for summary judgment having been granted and the action dismissed, this appeal followed.
The brief for the appellants was prepared by plaintiff George W. Stirton individually, and it is somewhat difficult to ascertain therefrom the exact basis of appeal. For that reason, it has been necessary for the court to review the record to ascertain whether there has been sufficient compliance with the statutory requirements to justify the granting of the summary judgment.
It is held that “in passing upon a motion for summary judgment, the primary duty of the trial court is to decide whether there is an issue of fact to he tried. If it finds one, it is then powerless to proceed further, but must allow such issue to be tried by a jury unless a jury trial is waived.”
(Walsh
v.
Walsh,
18 Cal.2d 439, 441 [116 P.2d 62].) See also
Desny
v.
Wilder,
46 Cal.2d 715 [299 P.2d 257],
It is to be noted that plaintiffs’ complaint contains the following allegation:
“That the said note and said Deed of Trust were contingent upon delivery to plaintiffs by the said Nick Pastor of certain articles of furniture and equipment located at 496 North Palm Canyon Drive, Palm Springs, California; that the said possession of the said articles was not delivered to plaintiffs,
[234]
and plaintiffs, therefore, did not make payment to the defendant, Nick Pastor, of the said sum of $600.00.”
In a declaration filed by plaintiff George W. Stirton, in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, he stated that “said delivery was expressly contingent upon delivery of the personal property described in the Mortgage of Chattels . . . free and clear of all claims of lien or encumbrances of every nature. That on the same afternoon ... I attempted to take possession of said personal property but was refused authority to do so . . .” Contrary declarations and affidavits are made by counsel who opposed Mr. Stirton in prior litigation and by counsel who represented him. It was argued at the hearing of the motion for summary judgment that Mr. Stirton’s statement was false and frivolous; but that was not a subject of investigation at the hearing of motion for summary judgment.
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