Nagle v. Valadez

DEVINE, J.

Rescission of a deed is sought in this action upon the propositions that the grantor was of unsound mind at the time of the execution and that he acted under undue influence of the grantee, the defendant.

The single ground of appeal is that the findings of fact are not supported by the evidence. We shall not relate the evidence at length because, so far as the parties are interested, they have been given a painstaking account of the evidence as

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it was analyzed by the able trial judge in his memorandum opinion, and because, so far as others may read this opinion, it accomplishes not much more than to add another stone to the fence which separates the trial court’s field of fact finding and the appellate court’s domain of questions of law. (4 Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 606, pp. 486, 487.)

On the subject of mental capacity, three witnesses, one of whom was the notary, testified that they were present when the deed was signed, and that the grantor, although 80 years of age and physically feeble, was alert, carried on a long conversation, had the deed read aloud to him, and was not confused. His own physician testified that the grantor was well oriented and alert during the period when the deed was executed, although he was not present on the occasion of the signing. Against this, appellant produced her own testimony that the grantor was forgetful, and testimony by a physician who had never seen the grantor about the effects of arteriosclerosis, with which grantor was afflicted, in general as producing confusion and disorientation. The doctor’s testimony, besides the fact that it is somewhat at variance with plaintiff's own testimony to the effect that since the grantor has been removed from company with the grantee he has had a very good mind and that he is able to carry on ordinary, intelligent conversation, also conflicts with the evidence produced by defendant, and, of course, that evidence is substantial and supports the trial judge’s finding that the grantor was competent. The issue of mental capacity is essentially factual.

(Nessen

v.

Nessen,

218 Cal. 59 [21 P.2d 415].)