Goody v. City of El Cajon

California Court of Appeal Oct 2, 1961 No. Civ. 6702Published

Before: Griffin

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Holding. The court held that a police officer's act of racing a vehicle's motor, which resulted in the vehicle moving and injuring the plaintiff, constituted 'operation' of a motor vehicle under Vehicle Code section 17001, regardless of the officer's subjective intent. Consequently, the city could be held liable for the officer's alleged negligent operation, making the issue a question of fact for the jury.

Issues

Whether a police officer's act of racing a vehicle's motor, resulting in the vehicle moving and causing injury, constitutes 'negligent operation' under Vehicle Code section 17001.
Whether the officer's subjective intent not to operate the vehicle precludes a finding of 'operation' under the statute.

Disposition. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The question of whether the officer was “negligently operating” the car at the time of the injury was a factual question for the jury.”

“The question of intent is not a determining factor.”

“Under them, “operation” of the car does not necessarily include an intention to move it.”

[7]

GRIFFIN, P. J.

Plaintiff-appellant Gene A. Goody brought a personal injury action for damages against defendants-respondents city of El Cajon and Earl Irey, alleging that defendant Irey was employed as a police officer in the City of El Cajon Police Department; that plaintiff owned a 1957 Ford pickup truck; that on October 6, 1958, Irey, in the course of his employment, stopped plaintiff while plaintiff was driving his truck on a public street for the use of a loud muffler. He ordered plaintiff from the truck in order to check the sound of the muffler. Irey entered the car and raced the motor in such a careless manner as to cause the ear to jolt forward for a distance of about 6 feet, catching plaintiff’s arm and dragging him with the truck, causing injury to him.

Defendants city and Irey answered, admitted that an accident had occurred, but denied the general allegations and alleged contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff. The cause was set for jury trial. The pretrial order recited that one of the issues involved was whether plaintiff had complied with the law in reference to filing a verified claim. It was stipulated that although a verified claim was filed with the clerk of the city of El Cajon, no verified claim for damages was presented in writing and

filed

with the officer, as required by Government Code, section 1981. It was then stipulated that for purposes of permitting a motion for judgment in favor of defendant Irey, said motion could be made at that stage of the proceedings instead of at the time of completion of plaintiff’s evidence. Counsel for Irey then moved for a nonsuit and judgment was accordingly rendered in his favor on July 13, 1960. On June 30, 1960, in chambers, defendant city objected to the introduction of any evidence against the city of El Cajon and it moved for judgment on the pleadings, and it was stipulated that such objection and motion could be then made with the same force as if made after the jury had been impaneled and the first witness sworn. It was stipulated that Irey had, as alleged in the complaint, entered the vehicle of plaintiff for the purpose of testing the sound of the muffler by accelerating the engine and “that this purpose was not to operate the automobile.” The city objected to the introduction of any evidence against it. Respective counsel also stipulated, as we interpret it, that plaintiff filed the required claim against the city; that counsel for plaintiff may amend his complaint during the progress of the trial as to such filing and compliance with the law in respect thereto and that de

Goody v. City of El Cajon

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GRIFFIN, P. J.

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