Harrison v. Englebrick

SALSMAN, J.

Plaintiff Wilson Harrison, an employee of Oakdale Poultry Company, was injured in the course of his employment by the alleged negligent conduct of William Englebrick, Jr., and Safeway Stores, Inc. on October 15, 1961. He filed a complaint against Englebrick and Safeway in the Municipal Court, Santa Rosa Judicial District, Sonoma County April 3, 1962, within one year of his injury. On October 13, 1964, appellant Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., which as compensation carrier for Oakdale Poultry had paid Harrison workmen’s compensation benefits, filed a complaint in intervention

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in Harrison’s action against Engle

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brick and Safeway, seeking recovery of such sums and to have the amount thereof declared a lien upon any judgment rendered in favor of Harrison against the defendants Englebrick and Safeway. Thereafter Harris on filed an amended complaint, increasing his prayer for damages beyond the jurisdictional limits of the municipal court, and that court then ordered the action transferred to the superior court.

In the superior court, defendants Englebrick and Safeway demurred to the complaint in intervention on the ground that the cause of action therein contained was barred by the statute of limitations. The superior court sustained the demurrer of the defendants without leave to amend, and entered judgment dismissing appellant’s complaint. The intervenor appeals.

Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision 3 fixes the time within which an action for personal injuries must be filed at one year. Here, Harrison’s action was commenced within one year from the date of his injury and was therefore timely filed, but appellant’s complaint in intervention was not filed until almost three years from the date of injury. Thus, the single issue on appeal is whether the cause of action expressed in the complaint in intervention is barred by the one-year statute of limitations. As will appear, we conclude that the complaint in intervention was timely filed and therefore reverse the judgment.

Harrison’s rights against his employer are limited to compensation pursuant to the workmen’s compensation provision of the Labor Code (Lab. Code, § 3601) because his injuries were sutained in the course and scope of his employment. This fact, however, does not affect his claim or right of action to recover damages for his personal injuries against negligent third persons who may have caused his injuries. (Lab. Code, § 3852.)