Besoyan v. Division of Labor Law Enforcement

COUGHLIN, J.

This is an appeal from an order of the probate court, following levy of execution, directing payment of a judgment from certain funds payable to appellant as beneficiary under a spendthrift trust. The judgment in question was the renewal of a judgment entered against appellant and her husband on account of wages due. One of the issues for determination on this appeal is whether this judgment is collectable from the separate property of appellant; the funds being her separate property. The spendthrift trust referred to is set up in the decree of distribution in the above entitled estate pursuant to the last will and testament of Abkar Setrakian. Under this trust, appellant is entitled to $125,000, payable in 14 annual installments of $8,000 and a 15th installment of $13,000. Heretofore it has been determined that these installment payments constitute an interest in the income of the estate.

(Estate of Setrakian,

169 Cal.App.2d 795, 804 [338 P.2d 247].) Among other things, the trust provides: ‘ ‘ The interests of beneficiaries in principal or income shall not be subject to claims of their creditors or others, nor to legal process, and may not be voluntarily or involuntarily alienated or encumbered.” Previously the probate court decreed that the foregoing installments were payable from date of death and that any unpaid installments should bear interest at the rate of 4 per cent per annum. In the present proceeding that court ordered the amount of the judgment in question paid from the trust estate, but not exceeding the amount of the above-mentioned payable interest, at 4 per cent per annum, on the accrued unpaid installments. The second issue for determination on this appeal arises out of appellant’s contention that, because of the spendthrift provisions of the trust, none of the funds payable to her therefrom are subject to levy under the aforesaid writ of execution.

It is unnecessary for us to decide whether the liability of a wife’s separate property for an obligation reduced to judgment must be determined by that judgment

(Turner

v.

Tal

[835]

madge,