Coons v. Kary

FLEMING, J.

In an action on a contingent fee contract for legal services in a divorce, attorney N. E. Youngblood’s assignee obtained judgment for $7,500 against Maria Anna Kary, the client for whom Youngblood secured the divorce. The background of the contract and its relationship to Mrs. Kary’s divorce are shown in the following chronology:

November 1959—Mrs. Kary separated from her husband, and, advised by other attorneys, entered a property settlement with him.

March 1960—Mrs. Kary, through the same attorneys, filed suit for divorce.

May 1960—Mrs. Kary replaced her original attorneys with Youngblood. For his services she agreed to pay a retainer plus an unspecified percentage of any property he might obtain for her. in excess of that provided by the property settlement. Youngblood dismissed the pending divorce action and then

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filed suit for separate maintenance on behalf of Mrs. Kary.

June 1960—at the show-cause hearing Youngblood did not inform the court of his fee agreement with Mrs. Kary, and the court awarded Mrs. Kary $3,500 in attorney’s fees.

July 1960—the specific terms of Youngblood’s contingent fee contract were settled: a retainer of $6,000, which was paid, and an agreement to pay one-third the value of any excess property.

March 1961—at the trial the complaint for separate maintenance was amended to one for divorce. Mrs. Kary was awarded a divorce, $1,000 in additional attorney’s fees, and $36,300 more property than she had obtained under the property settlement agreement. Again, Youngblood did not inform the court of his contingent fee contract.

Mrs. Kary paid $4,600 of the $12,100 owed Youngblood under the contingent fee agreement and then made no further payments. Thereafter Youngblood’s assignee filed suit for the contract balance of $7,500, and, alternatively, for the reasonable value of Youngblood’s services.

Mrs. Kary claims the contract sued upon was one for a contingent fee in a matrimonial cause and as such contrary to public policy and void. She also contends that under a void contract Youngblood is not entitled to recover the reasonable value of his services.