Tomlins v. American Ins. Co.

California Court of Appeal Feb 1, 1968 No. Civ. 23744Published

Before: Draper

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Holding. The court held that the trial court committed prejudicial error by instructing the jury that estoppel to the statute of frauds could be established by a mere promise to reduce an oral agreement to writing, without requiring proof of unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment.

Issues

Whether an agent had ostensible authority to bind the defendant to a three-year employment contract.
Whether the statute of frauds bars enforcement of an oral employment contract not to be performed within one year.
Whether a promise to reduce an oral agreement to writing is sufficient to establish estoppel to the statute of frauds without unconscionable injury or unjust enrichment.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The use of the disjunctive “or” permitted the jury to find an estoppel on a mere promise to reduce the agreement to writing, without any element of unconscionable injury to plaintiff. The instruction was erroneous.”

DRAPER, P. J.

Plaintiff had judgment on jury verdict in this action for breach of an employment contract. Defendant •appeals.

Plaintiff had been employed for some four years by Crum & Forster Group, Inc. In September 1962, one Maas, defendant’s vice-president in San Francisco, asked whether plaintiff was interested in working for defendant. After negotiations with Maas, plaintiff went to defendant’s home office in New Jersey, at defendant’s expense, for interview with officers there. When he left he was told that decision would be reached at the home office and transmitted to him through Maas in San Francisco. A few days later, plaintiff and Maas met. It was agreed that plaintiff would go to work for defendant at an agreed salary. The evidence of plaintiff and Maas is in complete conflict on the question of whether there was an agreement on a term of employment. Under the established rule, we look to the testimony favoring the claim of plaintiff-respondent. Plaintiff testified that Maas said “there’s no way of getting a contract,” but that “a letter of intent” would be secured. Plaintiff testified “I was assured that I could expect to be there for three years and this would be confirmed in writing.” Plaintiff left his employment with Crum and went to work for defendant. He was discharged a week later.

Jury verdict was against defendant, but in favor of Crum

Forster, against whom recovery had been sought for inducing breach of contract. Plaintiff does not appeal from the judgment on that verdict. Defendant moved for directed verdict and for new trial. Both motions were denied, and this appeal followed.

[527]

Defendant contends that, as a matter of law, Maas was without authority to agree, for his principal, to a three-year term of employment. As to actual authority, the contention is sound, since there is no evidence of conduct of defendant causing Maas to believe that he had such power. But defendant is bound if Maas had ostensible authority. Such authority is established by proof of conduct of defendant which reasonably led plaintiff to believe that Maas was empowered to act

(Tomerlin

Tomlins v. American Ins. Co.

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DRAPER, P. J.

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