People v. Courtney

RICHARDS, J. pro tem.

*

Defendant was convicted of violating Penal Code, section 261, subdivision 1 (statutory rape). His motion for new trial was denied. He has appealed from the judgment of conviction and from the order denying his motion for new trial.

Defendant accomplished an act of sexual intercourse with a female who, at the time thereof, was under the age of 18 years and who was not his wife. She was, however, a married woman at the time the act occurred.

[62]

The only question presented is whether subdivision 1 of Penal Code, section 261 (statutory rape) applies where the female is not the wife of the defendant, is under the age of 18 years, hut is married.

The defendant contends that a fair construction of the applicable statute shows it was not the intent of the Legislature to thereby protect the morals of a married woman under the age of 18 years. He argues that a female child who, with consent, marries under the age of 18 years is thereby emancipated from parental authority (Civ. Code, § 204), and, if thereafter divorced, is capable of consenting to a second marriage though still under age. Hence, he argues, by a remarriage she is capable of consenting to contemplated acts of sexual intercourse even though under the age of 18 years.

We cannot agree. The purpose of the section is to protect young girls from illicit acts of intercourse. When a girl marries, consummation of that marriage with her husband is neither immoral nor illicit. The fact that a previously married female under 18 years of age may consent to a second marriage without parental consent does not mean that she can consent to illicit sexual intercourse so as to take it out of the statutory provision. The statute is explicit and does not except sexual intercourse with any female, married or unmarried, under the age of 18 years. The presence or absence of consent is immaterial in a prosecution under Penal Code, section 261, subdivision 1. The statute makes a girl under 18 years of age incapable of giving legal consent to illicit acts of intercourse.

(People

v.

Edwards,

163 Cal. 752, 757 [127 P. 58];