Caruso v. Snap-Tite, Inc.

JEFFERSON, J.

Plaintiff Paul Caruso appeals from an order granting the motion of defendants. Snap-Tite, Inc. and Jackson Appliance, Inc. to exclude evidence, on his alleged cause of action for legal services rendered, for failure to supply defendants with a sufficient bill of particulars (as provided under Code Civ. Proc., § 454).

Caruso, and two other plaintiffs (not involved in this appeal), filed a complaint in this action against Snap-Tite, Inc., Jackson Appliance, Inc. and against another corporation plus two named individuals and twenty doe defendants. The complaint is in two counts. The first count was brought on behalf of all plaintiffs (including Caruso) in quantum meruit in the amount of $1,050,000, - for services in clearing title to described real property. The second count, on which the bill of particulars was demanded, was brought on behalf of Car

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uso alone, also in quantum meruit but in the amount of $25,000, for legal services of an undescribed nature.

The only defendants served in the' action were Snap-Tite and Jackson Appliance, Inc. (the others named being out of state and not amenable to service of process). Both answered denying any indebtedness under either cause of action and, as to the second cause of action, specifically denying that Caruso had performed any services for them.

Defendants made two demands for a bill of particulars seeking details of the basis for the claim under count two. Plaintiff filed responses after each demand which the court found insufficient. The court denied the motion of defendants to exclude evidence made following the filing of the first response but, on August 25, 1967, granted the motion made after plaintiff filed his second response and indicated he could not improve on it.

After the briefs of the parties were filed in this court, we requested that each party submit a supplemental memorandum on the question of the appealability of the order of August 25, 1967. In the memoranda filed, the parties all take the position that the order is appealable.

It is axiomatic that “Since the right of appeal is wholly statutory, no judgment or order is appealable unless expressly so declared, i.e., unless it comes within one of the classes enumerated in the main statutes or is made appealable by a specific statute. [Citations.] And, since an appealable judgment or order is essential to appellate