People v. Plaehn

DRAPER, P. J.

Defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of burglary. The criminal proceeding was suspended, he was found to be a narcotics addict, and was committed to the California Rehabilitation Center April 12, 1962. On his assertion of defects in that commitment, writ of habeas corpus issued August 11, 1964, discharging him from the rehabilitation center and directing his return to the committing court for further proceedings in the criminal case. He was then sentenced to prison on the burglary charge, and appeals from the judgment.

Defendant points to statutes limiting time after conviction within which judgment must be pronounced (Pen. Code, § 1191), and providing for new trial if rendition of judgment be longer delayed (Pen. Code, § 1202). Unquestionably, the two and one-half years from guilty plea to judgment exceeds the time by which the basic 21-day period of section 1191 can normally be extended. The specific exceptions of that section for time required for determination of sanity or for report from a diagnostic facility are not applicable here.

Nonetheless, we are satisfied that section 1191 does not aid defendant. That section was last amended in 1957. It was not until 1961 that the procedure for rehabilitation of narcotics addicts (Pen. Code, § 6400 et seq.) was adopted. The rehabilitation statute directs suspension of imposition of sentence on the criminal charge during proceedings for rehabilitation commitment, and resumption of the criminal proceedings if the defendant is found not to be an addict (Pen. Code, §§ 6450, 6451). A defendant who is committed to the rehabilitation program, but found after 60 days there not to be a fit subject, is to be returned for further proceedings in the criminal ease (Pen. Code, § 6453). If he remains in the rehabilitation program more than 3 years, he may be recommended for discharge from that program, but still must be

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returned to the original court, and even then may be sentenced there on the original criminal charge (Pen. Code, § 6520). Obviously, rigid application of the 21-day limitation of section 1191 would defeat all these provisions. The cited sections of the rehabilitation act do not specifically refer to section 1191, but reason dictates that they must be deemed to modify that earlier enactment.