Turner v. State Department of Motor Vehicles

COUGHLIN, Acting P. J.

Defendant, the Department of Motor Vehicles, appeals from a judgment decreeing issuance of a writ of mandate directing it to grant plaintiff, Turner, a hearing in a proceeding instituted pursuant to the financial responsibility provisions of the Vehicle Code (Veh. Code, §§ 16000 et seq.), and to set aside its order suspending his driver’s license until the hearing had been determined.

On November 14, 1966, Turner was driving an automobile which collided with and injured a pedestrian named Chambers. Thereafter, the department demanded Turner post security in the sum of $10,000, pursuant to Vehicle. Code section 16080, or suffer suspension of his driver’s license. Turner did not post the security and the department ordered suspension of his license. The date of the demand for security or of the order of suspension does not appear from the record. On April 12, 1967, Turner’s attorney wrote the department; stated, in substance, he had reviewed the police accident report and the evidence appeared to be overwhelming that the cause of injury to the pedestrian was the fact he

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‘ darted out into the traffic and failed to look for traffic ’ ’ and " there is no reasonable cause to believe that under any known legal theory that Mr. Turner could be liable for any damages”; demanded the department afford Turner a formal hearing on the issue of whether security should be required; and also demanded the department stay its order of suspension until a hearing had been held. The department replied by letter dated April 24, .1967, stating it was “not authorized to determine fault or legal liability arising from an accident. This is usually deter

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mined by a suit for damages in a civil court having proper jurisdiction ’ ’; that there was no provision in the law for a hearing, or extending the effective suspension date; and when Turner complied with the financial responsibility law it would give further consideration to restoration of Ms driving privilege. Thereupon Turner filed the petition in the instant proceeding seeking a writ of mandate compelling the department to grant him a hearing on the issue of his “probable pecuniary culpability arising from the accident,” and directing it to set aside the order suspending his license until the hearing had been determined. At the hearing on this petition the only evidence introduced was the letters from Turner’s attorney and from the department in reply. The judgment is premised on these letters and upon facts alleged in the petition which are not denied in the department’s answer. It was not shown whether Turner filed a report of the accident as required by Vehicle Code section 16000. Attached to the department’s answer was a photographic copy of a report signed by Chambers showing he received substantial injury in an accident on November 14, 1966 involving himself, as a pedestrian, and an automobile driven by Turner. It was not shown whether there were other reports or other evidence upon which the department based its determination precedent to its demand for security.