City of Santa Monica v. Superior Court

HERNDON, J.

On August 20,1964, action was commenced by Tee Pee Enterprises, a corporation, doing business as The Plush Poodle, against the City of Santa Monica and

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certain of its officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, a temporary restraining order, and a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of certain of the city's gambling ordinances. The complaint filed herein alleges that plaintiff has carried on a cocktail lounge and bar business in the City of Santa Monica for many years and now desires to conduct upon its premises a game of cards, commonly called “Panguingui,” which would be played for money.

Plaintiff’s complaint further alleges that “Panguingui” is not a game prohibited by state law but that it is prohibited by various ordinances adopted by the City of Santa Monica. Among the several ordinances challenged is section 4230C of the Santa Monica Municipal Code which expressly provides: “No person shall operate, maintain or carry on, play at, or participate in, nor permit places owned or controlled by him to be used for playing of ‘panguingui’, ‘pan,’ or any similar game.” After alleging that the challenged ordinances are unconstitutional and void, the complaint further alleges as follows:

“There is presently pending before the Supreme Court of the State of California the case of

Edward Prival, etc.

v.

William J. Mooney, etc.

(LA 27776) [62 Cal.2d - (41 Cal.Rptr. 399, 396 P.2d 815)] in which the Supreme Court" is considering the validity of the gambling ordinances of the City of Long Beach under the provisions of Section 11, Article XI, of the California Constitution, and the defendant herein, .the City of Santa Monica, has filed in said matter presently before the Supreme Court, an amicus curiae brief, contending that the ordinances of the City of Long Beach are not unconstitutional and void in violation of said Section 11, Article XI, of the California Constitution.”

Plaintiff’s complaint then concludes with the allegation that because of the threatened enforcement of Santa Monica's ordinances, it “is unable to determine the legality of conducting a harmless and peaceful social and recreational activity in conjunction with its primary business, and will be unable to determine the legality of the same until the Supreme Court has acted upon the question presently before it. Pending such determination by the California Supreme Court, plaintiff has no adequate or speedy remedy and is entitled to a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction as hereinafter prayed. ’ ’