In Re of Kernan
Before: Pierce
PIERCE, P. J.
This petition for habeas corpus by a releasee at large under an involuntary commitment of a person not charged with a crime under Welfare and Institutions Code section 3100
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(formerly, and when petitioner was committed, Pen. Code, § 6500) seeks discharge upon several grounds. We discuss one of them only because we have determined that he is entitled to be released thereunder, namely, he is a person committed “as a result of such person’s having requested the district attorney to file a petition for his commitment” under said section 3100 and therefore has been under restraint beyond the period permitted under that portion of Welfare and Institutions Code section 3201 (formerly Pen. Code, § 6521) which reads as follows: “Any other provision of this chapter notwithstanding, in any case in which a person was committed pursuant to Article 3 as a result of such person’s
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having requested the district attorney to file a petition for his commitment, such person must he discharged no later than two years and six months after his commitment. ’ ’
If that provision were to be interpreted literally, petitioner would not qualify: his father was the person who requested the district attorney to file the petition. We have before us, however, authenticated copies of all documents pertaining to the commitment. Prom them it is clear that although the father was nominally the applicant, petitioner and his attorney from the outset cooperated so completely with the district attorney and the court as to demonstrate that commitment under the terms of the section was voluntary, i.e., effectually the act of petitioner himself.
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The facts disclosed are these: On April 23, 1962, petitioner’s father filed a petition alleging that his son Thomas (petitioner) had upon a number of occasions acquired and used Dilaudid, a narcotic drug as defined in the Health and Safety Code; that because of this he was a narcotic addict or in danger of becoming one within the meaning of section 6500 of the Penal Code (now Welf. & Inst. Code, § 3100). Physicians appointed to examine petitioner filed reports in which both diagnosed petitioner as being not yet an addict but a person imminently in danger of becoming one. Letters from petitioner’s attorneys, Schaber and Cecehettini, to Deputy District Attorney Reagor make it clear that petitioner, a college and a law school student, fully aware of his problem, was ready and willing to take advantage of the rehabilitation program offered by the state, and that if he had not been the titular applicant of the proceedings, it was a family affair in which he was fully cooperative.
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