Young v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board

Opinion

AULT, J.

Sears, Roebuck & Company, as real party in interest, appeals from a judgment of the superior court ordering a writ of mandate and requiring the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board to set aside its decision in an administrative proceeding entitled In the Matter of Jean C. Young, No. 71-7977. The decision of the board had, in turn, reversed the decision of its referee and held that Mrs. Young had voluntarily left her employment with Sears for other than a compelling reason and without good cause and that she was not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits. It also ordered her to return $25 she had received in benefits and relieved Sears’ reserve account of any liability for charges under section 1032 of the Unemployment Insurance Code. The superior court judgment turned this about. Costs in the amount of $48.50 were taxed against Sears.

The board filed a cross-appeal “for the purpose of insuring a consistent determination as to both petitioner’s rights to receive unemployment insurance benefits and the right to charge the employer’s account therefor.”

On appeal Sears contends (1) the evidence before the trial court (the record of the administrative hearing) shows as a matter of law that Mrs. Young voluntarily terminated her employment with Sears and is not entitled to unemployment insurance benefits, and (2) court costs should have been assessed against the board and not against Sears. The board takes a neutral position with respect to the controversy between Mrs. Young and Sears, arguing only that court costs were properly assessed against Sears by the trial court.

The facts are undisputed. Mrs. Young, a 20-year-old housewife, worked for Sears as a part-time sales clerk for approximately seven months and was

[609]

paid wages sufficient to qualify her for unemployment insurance compensation. Sears had an employment policy which required termination of female employees after six months of pregnancy. Mrs. Young informed her superior at Sears that she was pregnant and was given a company form to be filled out by her attending physician. On July 2, 1971 Mrs. Young visited her physician and he determined the expected date of birth to be October 9, 1971, and that she could physically work until October 1, 1971. On July 2, Mrs. Young submitted to Sears the doctor’s statement containing this information and was advised she could not work beyond July 9, in accordance with company policy.