Taylor v. Hayes

California Court of Appeal Apr 1, 1987 No. B024068Published

Before: Boren

AI Brief

AI-generated · verify before citing

Holding. The court held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by dismissing an action under the five-year statute when a plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable diligence in monitoring the trial date and alerting the court to an impending deadline, even if the court clerk initially set the trial date beyond the statutory limit.

Issues

Whether a county clerk's calendaring error that sets a trial date beyond the five-year statutory limit constitutes an exception to the mandatory dismissal rule.
Whether a plaintiff has a continuing duty to exercise diligence in monitoring the five-year deadline after requesting a trial de novo following arbitration.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“It is the plaintiff’s duty to keep track of the pertinent dates which are crucial to maintenance of his lawsuit, and to see that the action is brought to trial within the five-year period.”

“Taylor’s affirmative duty to bring her case to trial within five years did not cease when she filed her request for a trial de novo.”

“The record only shows that the delay in going to trial was caused by Taylor’s own miscalculation rather than by circumstances beyond her control”

Opinion

BOREN, J.

Phyllis Taylor’s personal injury suit was dismissed by the trial court under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310 et seq., which requires the dismissal of actions that have not been brought to trial within

[1409]

five years after being commenced.

We agree with the trial court that a calendaring error by the county clerk did not impede Taylor’s ability to comply with the statutory five-year requirement, and we affirm.

Facts

On February 6, 1981, then 17-year-old Phyllis Taylor filed her action to recover damages for injuries she received in a February 1980 automobile accident. Her father was appointed as guardian ad litem. The case was ordered to arbitration on June 4, 1984, and an award was rendered by the arbitrator on May 9, 1985. Taylor requested a trial de novo the following day. Six days later, on May 16, 1985, the county clerk notified Taylor that the trial de novo in her case was set to begin on July 21, 1986, which was, as it turned out, beyond the five-year limit.

Taylor apparently took no further action for more than a year after receiving notification of the date for the trial de novo. In the interim, the five-year mark passed on February 6, 1986.

In July 1986, defendant Carol Hayes filed her motion to dismiss on the ground that more than five years had passed since Taylor instituted her lawsuit. In opposition to the motion, Taylor argued that she had diligently prosecuted her case through discovery and the arbitration, and that her attorney believed the July 21 trial date was within the five-year statutory limitation because it corresponded with the issuance of the summons on July 20, 1981.

Unpersuaded by this argument, the trial court granted Hayes’s motion and dismissed Taylor’s lawsuit under section 583.310.

Discussion

Sections 583.310 and 583.360 unequivocally state that an action shall be dismissed if not brought to trial within five years of being commenced against the defendant. An action is commenced by any pleading that asserts a cause of action or claim for relief (§ 583.110, subd. (a)). There is no additional requirement that the action commenced by the pleading be served upon the defendant in order for the five-year period to begin running. As a general rule, the involuntary dismissal statutes begin to

Taylor v. Hayes

AI Brief

BOREN, J.

More from California Court of Appeal

Related research

AI Brief