Robinson v. City and County of San Francisco

[336]

Opinion

CHRISTIAN, J.

William Robinson, Jr., appeals from a summary judgment dismissing his complaint for false arrest.

Adolph Pippus operated a limousine rental service. In June 1967, Pip-pus’ services were retained for three days by Harold Cunningham, who called himself “Smokey Robinson,” impersonating an entertainer who used that stage name. Because Cunningham did not pay Pippus for his services, Pippus caused a criminal complaint to be filed in May 1968, charging that “Harold Cunningham also known as ‘Smokey Robinson’ ” refused to pay a “legal fare for a public passenger vehicle for hire.”

Respondent Toomey, a police officer of the City of San Francisco, and another police officer went with the arrest warrant to a night club at which appellant, using the stage name “Smokey Robinson,” was performing. The officers, after observing appellant’s act, concluded that he was the person named in the arrest warrant and in an accompanying identification memorandum. When the officers approached appellant with the arrest warrant, he denied being “Harold Cunningham,” but admitted being “Smokey Robinson”; appellant offered to show the officers identification—driver’s license, credit cards, draft card, Social Security card, etc.—to prove that he was not the individual named by the warrant, but the officers arrested him anyway. Respondent Toomey stated that appellant had been arrested on the basis of his being identified as “Smokey Robinson,” and that no attempt had been made to determine if appellant was “Harold Cunningham.”

The criminal case went to trial on June 25, 1968. Evidence was admitted that Harold Cunningham was not the same person as appellant, and that Harold Cunningham and not appellant hired Pippus. Appellant was found not guilty of the criminal charge arising from Pippus’ complaint.

A police officer is immune from liability for false arrest if, while acting pursuant to a warrant, he effects the arrest without malice and

in the reasonable belief

that the person arrested was the one named in the warrant. (Civ. Code, § 43.5(a).) There is no allegation of malice on the part of the arresting officers, but appellant disputes the reasonableness of their belief that appellant was the person named in the warrant in light of their refusal of his offer of identification. Appellant contends that the question of the reasonableness of the police officers’ belief that appellant was the person named in the arrest warrant presented a question of fact that should have been allowed to go to the jury.