In Re Marriage of Millet

Opinion

KAUS, P. J.

This proceeding, the fallout from a dissolution action, is an appeal by husband William B. Millet from a trial court order of May 1973 that he pay wife Bertha B. Millet $338 in attorney’s fees, claimed for services in collecting some $1,100 in unpaid spousal support owed by William.

[731]

The March 1971 interlocutory decree had required William to pay Bertha $130 a month or 40 percent of his gross income. The total amount owed for 1971 was $2,625. In March 1972, William still owed $1,065 of this amount. Bertha’s attorney wrote several dunning letters to William’s attorney. William did not pay. In October 1972, Bertha applied for, and the court granted, an order for the issuance of a writ of execution against William’s property.

Correspondence between Bertha’s attorney and William’s attorney followed. Bertha’s attorney requested the constable to levy on and sell William’s property. The levy of execution was lifted in January 1973 when William apparently agreed to pay the amount owed. He paid only the principal amount, $1,065, which left, with fees and interest, $90 owing for the year 1971.

In March 1973, Bertha made a motion for attorney’s fees and for $50 in costs. In April, the court granted Bertha’s motion. William contends the award of attorney’s fees is excessive.

Discussion

The reasonableness of an order for attorney’s fees is a matter which lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and absent a clear showing of abuse, the trial court’s determination will not be disturbed.

(Smith

v.

Smith,

1 Cal.App.3d 952, 958 [82 Cal.Rptr. 282].)

This is William’s argument: “The court based its award on the prevalent fee in the San Luis Obispo area for the collection of an uncontested debt, to wit, 30% of the amount recovered through the collection process, or $338.46. This amount is excessive for the simple reason that [husband] paid the support money owing before [wife’s] attorneys levied execution.”