In Re Marriage of Morris
Before: Kaufman
Opinion
KAUFMAN, Acting P. J.
Howard Morris (husband) appeals from an interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage in which the other community property was divided equally but community property consisting of $42,987.72 received in settlement of personal injuries to Leona Mae Morris (wife) was awarded to her in its entirety. Husband appeals contending first, that the court erred in failing to award husband offsetting community property to equalize the division and second, the court in awarding the entire settlement fund to wife
[825]
failed to consider whether the “interests of justice require another disposition” as required by subdivision (c) of Civil Code section 4800. We conclude that neither contention is well taken and affirm the judgment. (All statutory references will be to the Civil Code unless otherwise specified.)
The pertinent facts are undisputed. The parties were married July 1964 and were found by the court to have separated on February 15, 1980. On July 5, 1974, wife was injured by a runaway horse. She suffered a cerebral concussion, fractured left clavicle, left basilar skull fracture, injured right wrist and injured acromioclavicolar joint. On April 3, 1978, she received $42,987.72 in settlement of her personal injury claims. At the time of trial wife was 51 years of age, was not employed and had not been employed during the marriage.
Subdivision (a) of section 4800 requires the court upon dissolution of marriage to “divide the community property and the quasi-community property of the parties . . . equally” except upon written agreement of the parties or oral stipulation of the parties in open court.
Subdivision (c) of section 4800, however, provides: “Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision (a), community property personal injury damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries unless the court, after taking into account the economic condition and needs of each party, the time that has elapsed since the recovery of the damages or the accrual of the cause of action, and all other facts of the case, determines that the interests of justice require another disposition. In such case, the community property personal injury damages shall be assigned to the respective parties in such proportions as the court determines to be just, except that at least one-half of such damages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries. . ."
More from California Court of Appeal
- People v. Hill (1998)
- In Re Autumn H. (1994)
- Nwosu v. Uba (2004)
- In Re Casey D. (1999)
- Santisas v. Goodin (1998)
- Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011)
- People v. Rivera (2015)
- People v. Barnett (1998)
- People v. Serrano (2012)
- Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007)