PAMELA H. v. Superior Court

Opinion

CALDECOTT, P. J.

Petitioner Pamela H., a juvenile, seeks a writ of mandate after Judge William L. Blanckenburg of the Napa County Superior Court, sitting as a juvenile court, denied her motion for disqualification under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6.

Petitioner is charged in respondent court with running away from home (see Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601) and resisting arrest. A hearing was scheduled before Judge Blanckenburg for June 30, 1976. On June 12, 1976, petitioner’s attorney was aware of the hearing date and of the assignment of Judge Blanckenburg. On June 25, petitioner’s attorney filed with the court a motion to disqualify Judge Blanckenburg pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, with a supporting declaration.

[918]

Presented in this appeal is the issue of whether Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, which provides for disqualification of a trial judge on motion supported by affidavits of prejudice, can constitutionally be applied in juvenile court cases. We conclude that it can.

In 1958, in

Johnson

v.

Superior Court,

50 Cal.2d 693 [329 P.2d 5], the Supreme Court concluded that the statute was constitutional in a civil case. In the recent case of

Solberg

v.

Superior Court

(1977) 19 Cal.3d 182 [137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148], the Supreme Court ruled that section 170.6 is constitutional in a criminal case.

In

Solberg,

the Supreme Court referred to the

Johnson

case reaffirming its reasoning, by stating: “We then held that the method adopted by the Legislature for achieving its purpose was also reasonable. We first stressed the importance of maintaining the appearance as well as the fact of impartiality in the judicial system: the business of the courts, we observed, must be conducted in such a manner as will avoid even the ‘suspicion of unfairness.’ Secondly, we recognized the inherent difficulty of proving a state of mind such as prejudice, as well as the natural reluctance of courts to declare biased a judge who asserts that he is not. From these premises we reasoned that ‘In order to insure confidence in the judiciary and avoid the suspicion which might arise from the belief of a litigant that the judge is biased in a case where it may be difficult or impossible for the litigant to persuade a court that his belief is justified, the Legislature could reasonably conclude that a party should have an opportunity to obtain the disqualification of a judge for prejudice, upon a sworn statement, without being required to establish it as a fact to the satisfaction of a judicial body.’ ”