In Re David B.

California Court of Appeal Mar 30, 1977 No. Crim. 29817Published

Before: Potter

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Holding. The court held that a prosecutor cannot constitutionally subject a minor to a new fitness hearing or increased potential incarceration after the minor successfully challenges an initial adjudication order, as this creates a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness that violates due process.

Issues

Whether the state may relitigate a minor's fitness for juvenile court treatment after the minor successfully challenges an initial adjudication order.
Whether the prosecutor's filing of a new petition and fitness hearing following a successful collateral attack on a juvenile adjudication violates due process by chilling the minor's right to review.

Disposition. Peremptory writ issued.

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Due process of law requires that such a potential for vindictiveness must not enter into North Carolina’s two-tiered appellate process.”

“A person convicted of an offense is entitled to pursue his statutory right to a trial de novo, without apprehension that the State will retaliate by substituting a more serious charge for the original one”

[933]

Opinion

POTTER,

this habeas corpus proceeding, the minor challenges the validity of an adjudication order of September 16, 1976, of the Riverside County Superior Court which was based upon the minor’s admissions that he had committed violations of section 10852 of the Vehicle Code (tampering with a car) and section 449a of the Penal Code (arson). The validity of the admissions was attacked upon the dual grounds that the nature of the arson offense was not adequately explained and that the consequences of the admissions were insufficiently explained to the minor, who was not told either the nature of or the possible duration of the California Youth Authority commitment which might result.

After the adjudication in Riverside County, the juvenile proceeding was transferred to Los Angeles County. The minor’s motion to return the matter to Riverside County for further proceedings was denied and at a disposition hearing of November 5, 1976, the referee made a disposition order committing the minor to the California Youth Authority. A de novo rehearing before the juvenile court judge was held on December 16, 1976. At this time the court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to review the determination of wardship made by the Riverside court and thus found the admissions valid. The minor was again committed to the California Youth Authority.

Based on the petition to this court, an order to show cause was issued on February 2, 1977, commanding the juvenile court either to vacate the September 16, 1976, adjudication order and the December 16, 1976, commitment order and “in said matter, hold a new adjudication hearing” or, in the alternative, show cause why a writ of habeas corpus should not issue.

On March 4, 1977, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on the validity of the adjudication order. As a result of that hearing, the court found “that minor’s constitutional waivers were defective and that said waivers failed to comply with

In re Tahl,”

and based on such invalidity the court ordered that the September 16, 1976, adjudication order and the December 16, 1976, order committing minor to the California Youth Authority “are vacated and set aside.” On said date the court further ordered that a suitable placement order in another proceeding previously consolidated with the instant proceeding should remain in effect and the matter was continued to March 18, 1977, “for 15 day review.”

In Re David B.

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POTTER,

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