Collins v. County of Los Angeles
Before: Allport
Opinion
ALLPORT, Acting P. J.
It appears without conflict that James F. Collins, Jr., was actively employed by respondent as a deputy sheriff from January 2, 1951, to April 10, 1972. On March 13, 1972, he submitted a letter stating: “I hereby submit my resignation. . .” effective on April 10, 1972. “I am resigning and deferring my retirement.” On February 15, 1974, the Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board found
[596]
Collins to have sustained an injury in the course and scope of his employment and awarded him temporaiy total disability benefits from April 10, 1972, until September 11, 1972.
1
By petition for writ of mandate filed in the superior court Collins now seeks an order compelling the County of Los Angeles to pay him full salary for the period April 10 to September 11, 1972, in lieu of the temporary disability payments awarded him by the board. The trial court found that the resignation of April 10, 1975 [sic] made Labor Code section 4850 inapplicable, relegating Collins to traditional workmen’s compensation benefits. Collins appeals from the judgment entered pursuant to that finding. The appeal lies. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 904.1, subd. (a), 1110;
Cody
v.
Justice
Court, 238 Cal.App.2d 275, 277, fn. 1 [47 Cal.Rptr. 716].)
Contentions
Collins contends that he is entitled to full salary by virtue of pertinent provisions in Labor Code section 4850 as follows: “Whenever any . . . sheriff or any officer or employee of a sheriff’s office ... is disabled, whether temporarily or permanently, by injury or illness arising out of and in the course of his duties, he shall become entitled, regardless of his period of service with the . . . county, to leave of absence while so disabled without loss of salary, in lieu of temporary disability payments, if any, which would be payable under this chapter, for the period of such disability but not exceeding one year, or until such earlier date as he is retired on permanent disability pension.”
The county replies that, where an employee elects to resign his employment prior to the expiration of the maximum one year’s leave of absence under that section, he is only entitled to receive temporaiy disability payments being no longer entitled to a “leave of absence without loss of salary.”
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